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COMMENTS
PSYCHIATRY v. LAW IN THE PRE-TRIAL MENTAL
EXAMINATION: THE BIFURCATED TRIAL AND
OTHER ALTERNATIVES
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Psychiatry v. Law
Both law and psychiatry are frequently concerned with the evaluation, pre-
diction, and control of human behavior.' However, law is also concerned with
the protection of individual citizens from arbitrary intrusions by society or
its agents. The conflict between the disciplines engendered by the consideration
of this additional goal is dearly manifested in the substantive and procedural
law of criminal responsibility, competency to stand trial, and civil commitment -
A recent New York Court of Appeals case, Lee v. Erie County Court,3
highlights many of the practical difficulties resulting from the conceptual dif-
ferences4 between the two disciplines. Charged with a murder that occurred
two days after his release from a mental institution, the defendant pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity. lHe cooperated in the court directed psychiatric
examination but was found guilty despite the fact that two of the three psy-
chiatrists testifying found him to be insane at the time the alleged crime was
committed. 5
1. For evaluations of the correspondence between law and psychiatry see R. Allen,
E. Ferster & J. Rubin, Readings in Law and Psychiatry (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Readings]; S. Glueck, Law and Psychiatry: Cold War or Entente Cordiale? (1962); S.
Halleck, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Crime (1967); J. Katz, J. Goldstein & A.
Dershowitz, Psychoanalysis Psychiatry and Law (1967); K. Menninger, The Crime of
Punishment 90-142 (1968); T. Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (1963); T. Szasz, Psy-
chiatric Justice (1965); Halleck, The Psychiatrist and the Legal Process, Psychology Today,
Feb., 1969, at 25; Tapp, Psychology and the Law: The Dilemma, Psychology Today, Feb,
1969, at 16. Psychology has implications for law in areas other than criminal responsibility
and criminal procedure. See W. Bryan, The Chosen Ones (1971) (psychology and the jury
selection process); J. Marshall, Law and Psychology in Conflict (1966) (psychology and
the rules of evidence); Marshall, The Evidence, Psychology Today, Feb., 1969, at 48.
2. For the legal ramifications of mental disability in other areas than the criminal law
see R. Allen, E. Ferster & H. Weihofen, Mental Impairment and Legal Incompetency (1968)
(guardianship, estate planning, etc.); S. Brakel & R. Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the
Law (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Brakel & Rock] (rights of hospitalized individuals,
domestic relations, personal and property rights, etc.).
3. 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.YS.2d 705, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
4. "When one considers the enormous conceptual gulf that lies between proximate cause
and multiple causality, jural responsibility and psychic determinism, advocacy and psycho-
therapy, stare dedsis and the scientific method, one is almost driven to conclude that law
and psychiatry share about the same degree of ideological kinship as does the Mafia with the
Women's Christian Temperance Union .... " Readings, supra note 1, at ix (italics omitted).
5. 27 N.Y.2d at 435, 267 N.E.2d at 453, 318 N.YS. at 707. The two court appointed
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The appellate division reversed,0 ordered a new trial, and subsequently sus-
tained a prosecution motion for another psychiatric examination in preparation
for the second trial.7 Defendant refused to cooperate fully in this second exami-
nation. As a result, the examining psychiatrists could make no determination
of his mental condition at the time of the crime.8 Defendant contended that his
privilege against self-incrimination would be violated if he was forced to respond
to a psychiatrist's questions concerning his mental state at the time of the
alleged murder,0 and that the psychiatric examination was a critical stage of
the prosecution entitling him to the presence of counsel."0
Faced with admittedly complex issues, the court of appeals attempted to bal-
ance the competing premises of law and psychiatry as the following four hold-
ings illustrate: First, the court found that prior case law demanded the
application of the privilege against self-incrimination to mental examinations,11
but to avoid crippling the psychiatric value of such examinations, the court
held that a defendant waives his privilege when he asserts a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity.' 2 Second, in order for the trier of fact to obtain the full
benefit of the psychiatrist's diagnosis, the examiner should, when testifying, be
allowed to "make any explanation reasonably serving to clarify his diagnosis"
but "[tihis is not to say . that any admission as to the crime in question
can be considered by the jury in their determination of whether the defendant
committed the acts which constitute the crime charged."1 8 Third, the defendant
is entitled under the sixth amendment to counsel at this critical stage but,
since there is little likelihood that an effective psychiatric examination could be
conducted under the withering influence of continued legal objections by de-
psychiatrists testified for defendant Lee. A third psychiatrist's testimony that Lee was sane
was based on hospital records rather than an interview. This doctor was retained on the
morning of the day he testified. People v. Lee, 29 App. Div. 2d 837, 838, 287 NY.S.2d
607, 608-09 (4th Dep't 1968) (mem.).
6. 29 App. Div. 2d 837, 838, 287 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (4th Dept't 1968). The reversal and
new trial were based on the grounds that the People had not proven sanity beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Id.
7. Lee v. Erie County Ct., 33 App. Div. 2d 1093, 308 N.Y.S.2d 240 (4th Dep't 1970)
(mem.). The appellate division had previously overturned a contempt order issued by the
County Court of Erie County. People v. Lee, 32 App. Div. 2d 885, 302 N.Y.S.2d 171 (4th
Dep't 1969) (mem.).
8. 27 N.Y.S.2d at 436, 267 N.E.2d at 454, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
9. Id. at 437-38, 267 N.E.2d at 455, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
10. Id. at 443, 267 N.E.2d at 458, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 714; see notes 69-70 infra and ac-
companying text.
11. Id. at 439, 267 N.E.2d at 456, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 711. The court relied on Grosso v.
United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) ; Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) ; Garrlty
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control 13d., 382
U.S. 70 (1965); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); People v. Al-Kanani,
26 N.Y.2d 473, 260 N.E.2d 496, 311 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970); People v. DiPlazza, 24 N.Y.2d
342, 248 N.E.2d 412, 300 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1969).
12. 27 N.Y.2d at 441, 267 N.E.2d at 457, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
13. Id. at 441-42, 267 N.E.2d at 457, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 712-13.
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fendant's counsel, the role of counsel is limited to that of silent observer.' 4
Fourth, the court held that if the defendant refuses to cooperate, he may not
be deprived of his plea of insanity or his right to produce non-psychiatric evi-
dence of insanity, but the court may exclude psychiatric testimony offered by the
defendant.' 5
Since the result of this weaving of "psychiatric" and "legal" logic may
"create an impossible task for Trial Judge and jury"' 6 in some cases, Judge
Breitel suggested that "a bifurcated trial on the separate issues of legal insanity
and the merits should be considered."' 7 This comment will examine some of
the practical and conceptual problems of the current unitary procedures for
pre-trial mental examinations, analyze the bifurcated trial as a possible solution
to some of these problems, and discuss alternative solutions. The scope of the
discussion is limited to procedures directly affecting the criminal defendant,
criminal responsibility and competency to stand trial. Procedures for the
civil commitment of the mentally ill are not considered.
B. The Legal Background
Court ordered pre-trial mental examinations occur as the result of two dis-
tinct legal concepts: (1) that some defendants are of such mental condition at
the time of the alleged crime that they should not be held responsible for acts
which would otherwise be criminal-the insanity defense;' 8 and (2) that some
defendants are of such mental condition that they cannot meaningfully parti-
cipate in their defense and that it would be unfair to try such people-incom-
14. Id. at 444, 267 N..2d at 459,318 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
15. Id. at 442, 267 NE.2d at 457, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 713. The court ruled that if the
defendant wished to call psychiatrists on his own behalf, he would first have to satisfy the
court, in a preliminary hearing, that he had cooperated with a court-ordered mental exam
where one had been sought by the prosecution. Besides excluding the defendant's psy-
chiatric testimony, the trial court would be permitted to instruct the jury: (1) that the
defendant failed to cooperate; and (2) that there was a presumption of sanity and that the
jury must consider whether the presumption was rebutted by defendant's non-psychiatric
proof. Id. at 442-43, 267 NX.2d at 457-58, 318 N.YS.2d at 713. Dissenting in part, Judge
Breitel pointed to the contradictions involved in permitting non-psychiatric testimony while
excluding from jury consideration defendant's "medical (expert) testimony," especially since
"nonco-operation may be evidence of insanity just as much as it may be evidence of a
feigned issue of insanity.' Id. at 448-49, 267 NXE.2d at 462, 318 N.YS.2d at 719 (dissenting
opinion); see Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense
in the District of Columbia, 70 Yale L.J. 905, 921 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Krash]. As
to non-psychiatric testimony, see note 59 infra.
16. 27 N.Y.2d at 449, 267 NE.2d at 462, 318 N.YS.2d at 719 (Breitel, J., dissenting in
part).
17. Id.
18. The literature on the insanity defense is quite extensive. See A. Goldstein, The In-
sanity Defense (1967) [hereinafter cited as Insanity Defense] for a recent comprehensive
discussion of the insanity defense with thorough bibliographical notes. A more recent biblio-
graphical listing can be found in Brakel & Rock, supra note 2, at 423-29, which cites 20S
cases and over 90 commentaries on criminal responsibility and incompetence to stand tril
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petency to stand trial. 19 Legal insanity is usually phrased in terms of (1) the
defendant's inability to understand the nature and consequences of his act, or
(2) if he did understand it, his inability to distinguish right from wrong with
reference to it.20 Theoretically, legal insanity goes to the issue of "guilt" or
19. For a history of the incompetency rule see Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940-46
(6th Cir. 1899). In the past decade the amount of commentary regarding competency to
stand trial has approached that on the insanity defense. See, e.g., Bennett, Competency to
Stand Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 569 (1968); Danforth, Death Knell
for Pretrial Mental Examination? Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 19 Rutgers L. Rev.
489 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Danforth]; Eizenstat, Mental Competency to Stand Trial,
4 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 379 (1969); Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness,
7 Crim. L. Bull. 101 (1971); Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal
Defendants, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 832, 845 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Foote]; Guzman,
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Defendant in Arkansas, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 19 (1970); Hess
& Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results and Problems, 119 Am. J. Psy-
chiatry 713 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hess & Thomas]; Morris, The Confusion of Con.
finement Syndrome Extended: The Treatment of Mentally Ill "Non-Criminal Criminals"
in New York, 18 Buffalo L. Rev. 393 (1969); Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand
Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 Am. J. Psychiatry 616 (1966); SilvIng, The
Criminal Law of Mental Incapacity, 53 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 129 (1962); Slough & Wilson,
Mental Capacity to Stand Trial, 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 593 (1960); Vann & Morganreth, Psy-
chiatrists and the Competence to Stand Trial, 42 U. Det. L.J. 75 (1964); Vann & Morganroth,
The Psychiatrist as Judge: A Second Look at the Competence to Stand Trial, 43 U. Det.
LJ. 1 (1965); Comment, The Effect of the New York Criminal Procedure Law Upon the
Treatment of the Mentally Incompetent Defendant, 20 Buffalo L. Rev. 646 (1971); Note,
Incompetency to Stand Trial 81, Harm. L. Rev. 454 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 81 Harv.
L. Rev.]. For further bibliography see materials cited in note 18 supra.
20. This is the famous test from M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The American
Law Institute's (ALI) suggested rule qualifies and adds to M'Naghten: "(1) A person is
not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrong-
fulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (2) As used
in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct." Model Penal Code § 4,01
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
A tabulation published in 1967 categorizes thirty states and Great Britain as using the
M'Naghten test alone; eighteen states, the federal system, and the military court system
as using, in addition to M'Naghten, a verbal formula which includes in the definition of
legal insanity those people who, as a result of mental disease or defect, were unable to
conform their conduct to the requirements of law (reflecting partially the influence of the
ALI rule); and the District of Columbia, Maine, New Hampshire, and the Virgin Islands
as using the Durham rule: "[Ain accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or mental defect." Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Bazelon, J.) (footnote omitted) Insanity Defense, supra note
18, at 45, 67 & 241 n.1. For discussions of the above mentioned rules see Insanity Defense
45-66, 67-79, 80-96; R. Perkins, Criminal Law 858-78 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Perkins]. The criteria of mental responsibility in foreign countries is discussed in Model
Penal Code § 4.01, app. A at 162-69 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) ; Report of the Royal Comm'n
on Capital Punishment, Cmd. No. 8932, app. 9, at 407-08, 411-13 (1953). New York has
[Vol. 40
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"innocence" and refers to defendant's mental condition at the time of the
alleged crime. Incompetency to stand trial, on the other hand, involves a different
standard: The defendant's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings
against him and to assist in his own defense.2 ' The incompetence refers to the
defendant's mental state at the time of the proceedings against him rather than
at the time of the alleged crime. In recent years, the courts,a legislatures,2- and
commentators 4 have insisted on the adherence to these conceptual differences
because the existing confusion of the two ideas resulted in the commitment of
defendants who were capable of standing trial, but who may or may not have
been otherwise mentally ill.25
adopted a variation on the M'Naghten and ALI rules, excluding the "conformity" formula of
ALI, but expanding MUNaghten by requiring only "substantial incapacity" and by indicating
that defendant's "appreciation" of his conduct is part of the test rather than just " mere sur-
face knowledge or cognition." Denzer & McQuillan, Practice Commentary to N.Y. Penal Law
§ 30.05 (McKinney 1967).
21. The test for incompetency to stand trial is whether the defendant "'has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him." Dusky v. United States, 362 US. 402 (1960) (per curiam). Under the new Criminal
Procedure Law, New York has brought itself into accord with the definition in Dusky:
"'Incapacitated person' means a defendant who as a result of mental disease or defect
lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense."
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.10 (McXinney 1971). It may be noted that the New York
definition uses the disjointive "or" which might be relevant if, for example, it were possible
for a defendant to consult effectively with his lawyer but still be lacking in a "rational
understanding of the proceedings against him." From a conceptual viewpoint, defendant's
"rational understanding" should be relevant only in so far as it affects his ability to effectively
consult with his counsel. But see 81 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 19, at 458, for justifications
for a dual test including rational understanding.
22. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 378 (4th Cir. 1971); Floyd v. United
States, 365 F.2d 368, 374 n.9 (5th Cir. 1966); State v. Jones, 278 N.C. 259, 266, 179 S.E2d
433, 438 (1971).
23. Compare Law of Aug. 2, 1961, § 1, [19611 Ill. Laws 72d Sem. 2622, with IL Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, § 104-1 to -3 (Smith-Hurd 1970). Compare Law of June 14, 1939, cI. 861,
§ 2, [19391 N.Y. Laws 162d Sess. 2190, and Law of April 8, 1943, ch. 402, § 3, [1943) N.Y.
Laws 166th Sess. 924, with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.10(1) (McKinney 1971).
24. E.g., Guzman, supra note 19, at 21-24; Lewin, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Legal
and Ethical Aspects of an Abused Doctrine, 1969 Law & the Social Order 233 [hereinafter
cited as Lewin]. "Although courts pay lip service to the distinction between the fact of
mental illnen and the legal conclusion of mental incompetency, this distinction is seldom
actually kept." Id. at 239. For a collection of other commentators making similar observa-
tions see id. n.31.
25. Readings, supra note 1, at 380. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Mental
Illness, Due Process and the Criminal Defendant 82-83 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Mental
Illness, Due Process (1968)]; Hen & Thomas, supra note 19, at 713; Lewin, supra note
24, at 239-42. In Michigan, following a medical audit investigation identifying the confusion
of standards, 200 patients were returned to trial during two months, some of whom were
long time inmates. Lewin, supra note 24, at 241-42. In 1961, records in Michigan's Ionia
Hospital indicated that defendants were being committed because of "hostile and aggressive
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Though legal insanity and incompetence to stand trial are conceptually dis-
crete, they are closely related in several practical ways. A great number of those
who might ultimately assert the insanity defense are siphoned away from the
criminal process through the concept of incompetence. Both concepts usually
involve pre-trial psychiatric examinations, and since those asserting the insanity
defense will usually be examined for competence, the psychiatrist's conclusions on
both issues are frequently determined at the same examination. The pre-trial
mental examination will be crucial to the defendant's freedom or to society's
disposition of the defendant under both concepts. 28
H PpOBLEmS ARIsING UNDm E CUMENT PROCEDURE
A. Constitutional Infirmities of the Pre-Trial Mental
Examination to Determine Sanity
1. The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination protects an "accused's communica-
tions, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are
also communications .... "27 Although the accused may be forced to respond
to court orders which make him the source of real or physical evidence, e.g.,
fingerprints,28 defendant's testimonial and communicative responses are clearly
protected.2
To be effective, the mental examination usually requires an interview with the
defendant. This is especially true if the examination is to determine defendant's
mental state at some previous time-as in the case of determining criminal
tendencies" and other reasons not directly probative of incompetency. Comment, Criminal
Law-Insane Persons-Competency to Stand Trial, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 1078, 1082-83 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as 59 Mich. L. Rev.].
26. See Danforth, supra note 19, at 490. "Statutes which permit or require pre-trial
mental examination of an accused have been found in the District of Columbia and every
state. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide for such examination. Many
state statutes, however, are not clear as to whether the examination is to determine com-
petency to stand trial or responsibility at the time of the alleged crime or both." Id. at
490 n.4. Apparently the New York Criminal Procedure Law has either eliminated the sanity
examination or entered the ranks of those statutes where the proper purpose of the author-
ized examination is unclear. Section 658 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorized an
examination "if the defendant [made] a plea of insanity to the indictment . . . " Law of
June 14, 1939, ch. 861, § 658, [1939] N.Y. Laws 162d Sess. 2190. However, this section has
been carried over into Article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law which authorizes a mental
examination "for the purpose of determining if [defendant] is an incapacitated person."
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.10(3) (McKinney 1971). Since "incapacitated person" is deined
in terms of competency to stand trial, Id. § 730.10(1), a literal interpretation of the statute
should not permit an examination to determine the defendant's state of mind at the time
of the crime charged.
27. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966).
28. Id. at 764 (dictum); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932); F. Inbau,
Self-Incrimination (1950); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2265(1), (4), (6) (McNaughton rev.
1961).
29. 384 U.S. at 763-64; 8 Wigmore, supra note 28, § 2263.
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responsibility. 30 The examinee responds to the questions put to him, and his
answers help form the psychiatrist's opinion of the mental state of the defendant
at the time of the alleged crime.al
The incriminatory nature of defendant's responses becomes apparent through
an analysis of the elements of criminal conduct. Both common law and statutory
codifications of criminal law generally require two elements for a crime: an overt
act, the actus reus; and a culpable mental state, the mens reaPce It is also a
fundamental principle of criminal law that the prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt every element of the crime chargedP Therefore, generally
speaking, the prosecution must show that the defendant performed the unlawful
overt act and that he did so with the required unlawful intention. " 4 If the prose-
cution fails to show that the defendant performed the overt act with an unlawful
intention, or if the defendant can introduce sufficient evidence to raise a reason-
able doubt in the jury as to whether he had the unlawful intention, the defendant
is entitled to acquittal. Without the mens rea there is, by definition, no crime.a5
From the perspective of this analysis, it is fairly easy to see that the defen-
dant's introduction of the insanity "defense" is an attempt to show that he
never committed the crime charged since he was incapable of entertaining the
required unlawful intent.3 6 Rather than being a "confession and avoidance," it
30. See RoIlerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Bazelon, C. J.) ; Dan-
forth, supra note 19, at 495; Krash, supra note 15, at 918 n.70 and accompanying text.
31. For descriptions of the procedure of the psychiatric exam see Readings, supra note 1,
at 69-82; Meyers, The Psychiatric Examination, 54 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 431 (1963); Note,
Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An
Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 648 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as 83 Harv. L. Rev.]. In some instances, the examination may involve the ap-
plication of drugs to the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69, 187 N.E2d
116, 236 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1962); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-2(5) (a) (Perm. Supp. 1965).
32. See Perkins, supra note 20, at 743; 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 81 (1965). There
are some offenses of "strict liability" but these are usually relatively minor. See Perkins
799-809. The acus reus of these offenses has been described as malum prohibitum as
opposed to malum in se. Id. at 784-98.
33. E.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (dissenting opinion); People
ex rel Juhan v. District Ct., 165 Colo. 253, 257, 439 P2d 741, 743-44 (1963); N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law § 70.20 (McKinney 1971).
34. Most of the more serious crimes require the overt act to be performed "intentionally'
However, the culpable mental state might include a concept of conscious disregard of con-
sequences or gross negligence as well as intention. E.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05 (McKinney
1967) (definition of culpability).
35. Assuming that the crime charged is a "true" crime defined in terms of mens rea,
and not an offense of "strict liability." See note 32 supra.
36. See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"--Why Not?, 72 Yale L.. 853,
862-63 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Abolish the Insanity Defense]; Loulsell & Hazard,
Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 805, 803-09, 812-14 pamsm
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Louisell & Hazard]; cf. State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 112, 471
P.2d 715, 724, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1970); State v. Bishop, 128 Vt 221, 260 A.2d
393 (1969). However, "the notion that a mentally ill person should not be held criminally
responsible is sometimes expressed by saying that a mentally ill person is not subject to
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denies one of the elements of the crime itself. 7 Consequently, in a court ordered
pre-trial mental examination, responses made to an examiner who will later
appear as a prosecution witness may help to incriminate the defendants since they
provide a basis for the prosecution's attempt to persuade the jury that the
requisite mental element of the crime was present. 88
Furthermore, if the court ordered pre-trial sanity examination is to have any
value under the unitary system of trial, the psychiatrist must be allowed to
testify, whether for defense or prosecution. New York, in accord with the
developing trend,8 9 has held that "[t]o prevent the psychiatrist from giving the
punishment for his crime." Louisell & Hazard 805-06 (emphasis deleted). Under such a
formulation, the insanity defense would be a "confession and avoidance," the defendant would
be admitting the factual allegations of the charge but attempting to avoid the usual legal
consequences by asserting his mental disorder at the time of the crime. See Report of the
Royal Comm'n on Capital Punishment, supra note 20, at 79, 98; Abolish the Insanity
Defense 854. This view seems more consistent with English criminal terminology than
American, since English juries return a verdict of Guilty But Insane. See S. Gluec,, supra
note 1, at 35-38. Those states which require the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt emphasize through their procedure the connection between mens rea and
insanity at the time of the crime. The procedure of those states placing the burden of proof
as to insanity upon the defendant offers no contradiction to the view that insanity is a
confession and avoidance. See note 46 infra. It is possible, however, to plead both not guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity even in jurisdictions which require the defendant to
bear the burden of proof, indicating that the defendant does not have to admit the facts
of the charge in order to assert his insanity defense. Furthermore, in most jurisdictions, the
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity does not include a specific finding that the de-
fendant committed the overt act and that he would be guilty but for his insanity defense.
Also, some cases of mental disorder would be consistent with a theory of avoiding punish.
ment (A intends to kill B, but is laboring under a religious delusion); while others would
clearly negate the required intent (A intends to shoot B but does not appreciate the per-
manent consequences). Therefore, while it may be sounder policy to regard the insanity
defense as a confession and avoidance, the current terminology of criminal law presents
formidable obstacles to such a view. But the two formulations of the insanity defense, (1)
as negating an essential element of crime, or (2) as avoiding punishment, seem to be
reflections of the present inconsistency in the criminal law. This comment argues that the
conceptual terminology of the criminal law supports the former view, while the practical
outcome of an insanity defense supports the latter. If this is so, promoting one view over
the other approaches, in effect, arguing as to whether "a glass is half empty or half full."
It is submitted that discussion should focus upon the policies underlying the insanity defense
and the wording and practice of the criminal law should be altered to conform to the
conclusions reached.
37. See note 36 supra.
38. Brief for Petitioner-Respondent at 13-14, Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d 432,
267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971); 83 Harv. L. Rev., supra
note 31, at 648 (contending the fifth amendment is infringed in the very probing of the
defendant's psychic condition).
39. Some courts have indicated that even under the narrow M'Naghten criteria a psy-
chiatrist should not be restricted in his testimony. See People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394
P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964) (In Bank); People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d
53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949); People v. Haun, 71 Ill. App. 2d 262, 217 N.E.2d
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basis of his opinion would vastly limit the value of psychiatric examinations.'4 0
But in avoiding the procrustean attempt to mold psychiatric testimony into
legal pigeonholes, the court must throw upon the jury the formidable task of
weighing any admission of the defendant divulged by the psychiatrist-witness
only in their evaluation of the medical conclusions and not "in their determina-
tion of whether the defendant committed the acts which constitute the crime
charged." 4' While the appropriate instruction to the jury might protect the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination in a theoretical sense, practi-
cally speaking the result is a severe infringement of the privilege because of the
likelihood that the jury will be unable to avoid the implications of the psychia-
trist's testimony on the issue of whether the defendant committed the actus
reus.4
To avoid the conclusion that the privilege against self-incrimination obtains
at a pre-trial mental examination, some courts have advanced the contention
that defendant's responses should be considered "real evidence" rather than
"testimony," 43 and thus beyond the scope of the privilege. This contention seems
470 (1966); Insanity Defense, supra note 18, at 54. The Model Penal Code has called for
full explanation of psychiatric testimony. Model Penal Code § 4.07(4) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962); Model Penal Code § 4.07, Comment at 198 (Tent Draft No. 4, 1955); d.
Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); and several jurisdictions have
adopted the ALI or Durham test of insanity, thus recognizing that the psychiatric testimony
should not be limited by the possibility of a narrow interpretation of MNaghten. Eg.,
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 32S Fad
420 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961); Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); Mle. Rev. Stat. Ann. lit. 15, § 102 (1965); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 552.030 (Vernon Supp. 1971); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4801 (1958).
40. Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d at 441, 267 N.E.2d at 457, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 712
(citation omitted).
41. Id. at 441-42, 267 N.E.2d at 457, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 712-13.
42. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964); United States v. Bennett, No. 24,387 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 19, 1972); Sims v. United
States, 405 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932).
In Bennett, the psychiatrist testified that the defendant's sanity was evidenced by his " 'vry
good recollection of the events of the alleged events [sic]. He recalls minutely what happened
prior to the offense, of the alleged offense, and following it. He expressed his own version of
the story, his feelings about it . . . ." United States v. Bennett, supra at 10-11, quoting
record at 224-25. "Obviously, a limiting instruction cannot be expected to remove all traces
of prejudice where the jury is told, in effect, that the defendant confessed to his crime." Id.
at 14 (dictum) (footnote omitted) (the court found the limiting instruction an unsatisfactory
solution but opted for a bifurcated trial on remand, thus avoiding a precise holding on the
limiting instruction. Id. at 19). See Model Penal Code § 4.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233, § 23B (Supp. 1971); Judicial Conference of the District of
Columbia Circuit, Report of the Committee on Problems Connected With Mental Examina-
tion of the Accused in Criminal Cases, Before Trial 111 n.1 (1965).
43. E.g., United States v. Handy, No. 71-1924 (9th Cir., Oct. 20, 1971); United States
v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.
1968); Pope v. United States, 372 Fad 710 (8th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 401 U.S. 949
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dearly a result-oriented distortion rather than a true appraisal of the defendant's
participation in the psychiatric examination. The New York Court of Appeals
specifically rejected this view in Lee: "In formulating an opinion on a defen-
dant's mental capacity, the physicians must draw from both physical and verbal
responses. Inasmuch as these responses are relevant on a material element of the
crime, mens rea, we are unable to analogize them to the mere exhibition of one's
body." 44 Given the traditional view of the privilege against self-incrimination,
the nature of the psychiatric examination, and the connection between the de-
fendant's mental capacity and the existence of a crime, it is difficult to argue
with the Lee conclusion that the fifth amendment applies to pre-trial psychiatric
examinations involving defendant's mental condition at the time of the alleged
crime.45
However, though the definition of crime dictates the application of the fifth
amendment to psychiatric examinations, the court so holding must face the very
practical problem of dealing with the defendant who would stand on his privilege
and refuse to cooperate with the examination. To allow the defendant to choose
the only psychiatrist who may testify on the basis of an in-depth interview, and
to force any prosecution expert to rely on records, etc., would weight the scales
at trial in favor of the defendant in those jurisdictions requiring the prosecution
to prove legal sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.40
(1971); United States v. Fletcher, 329 F. Supp. 160 (D.D.C. 1971); Hunt v. State, 248
Ala. 217, 27 So. 2d 186 (1946); Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971); Rogers v. State, 222 Miss. 690, 76 So. 2d 831 (1955); State v. Grayson,
239 N.C. 453, 80 S.E.2d 387 (1954). Contra, Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (dictum); Johnson v. People, 172 Colo. 72, 470 P.2d 37 (1970); French v. District
Ct., 153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963); Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d
452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971); see State ex rel. La Follette v.
Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967). See also California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424,
431-34 (1971) (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by three justices) (upholding California
statute which required motorist involved in accident to give his name and address); Early
v. People, 142 Colo. 462, 352 P.2d 112, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 847 (1960); State v. Huson, 73
Wash. 2d 660, 440 P.2d 192 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1096 (1969).
44. 27 N.Y.2d at 439, 267 N.E.2d at 456, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
45. Id; cf. 83 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 31, suggesting that while the application of the
privilege "is determined dearly neither by Supreme Court precedent nor by the general
history of the privilege" (id. at 653) the question should be resolved in favor of application
because the psychiatric examination conflicts with the values protected by the privilege. Id.
at 655-57.
46. Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d at 440-42, 267 N.E.2d at 456-58, 318 N.Y.S.2d
at 711-13 (indicating that the burden would be "insurmountable" in New York since the
prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt). The defendant is everywhere
presumed sane. Insanity Defense, supra note 18, at 111, citing H. Weihofen, Mental Dis-
order as a Criminal Defense 214 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Weihofen]. In roughly half
of the states both the production burden and the persuasion burden are on the defendant.
Insanity Defense 111-12; 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 52 (1965). In the other half, the
defendant has the initial production burden which is satisfied by the introduction of "some
evidence" of insanity and the prosecution has the persuasion burden. Insanity Defense 112,
citing Weihofen 219-28, 241; 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 52 (1965). In most states
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The Lee court, like several others, handled this possibility by holding "that
the privilege is waived when a defendant interposes his insanity defense."1 7
Practically speaking this may be a reasonable compromise, but it leaves much
to be desired constitutionally. The constitutional infirmity lies latent in the
following language from an earlier New York case quoted with approval in Lee:
It must be remembered that the orders for the examination and observation were
based upon the defendants' claim that they should escape punishment by reason of
their mental condition at the time of the commission of the acts charged .... Under
those circumstances defendants may not both advance their claims and then seek to
make the rules for the determination of those daims. s
But since unlawful intent is an essential element of the crime, the import of the
court's logic is that one cannot simultaneously assert that he is "not guilty" of
the crime charged and that he is entitled to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.49
If the defendant asserted that he should not be punished because he could not
possibly have committed the actus reus, e.g., because he was out of the country
when the crime was committed, no court would indulge the notion that the
defendant could not assert both his alibi defense and his privilege against self-
incrimination. Given the fact that crimes are defined in terms of both overt act
and unlawful intent, there would seem to be little analytical difference between
the denial of the right to assert the insanity defense and the alibi defense. Practi-
cally speaking, however, the difference is overwhelming since an alibi can be
checked by independent field work, whereas the merits of a defendant's insanity
defense are almost exclusively within his control. Faced with the resulting im-
balance at trial 59 if the defendant chooses to stand on his privilege, the New York
which place the burden on the defendant, he is required to prove his insanity by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Id.
47. 27 N.Y.2d at 441, 267 N.E.2d at 457, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 712. As noted in Lee, the fol-
lowing decisions have also found waiver of the self-incrimination privilege in the context of
psychiatric examinations. United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
402 US. 949 (1971) ; United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1005 (1970) ; United States v. Albright, 388 F.d 719 (4th Cir. 1968) ; In re Spencer, 63
Cal. 2d 400, 406 P.2d 33, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1965); State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A2d
763 (1965); State v. Myers, 220 S.C. 309, 67 SX.2d 506 (1951). Contra, Hall v. State, 209
Ark 180, 189 S.W.2d 917 (1945); People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 369 Pad 714, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 165 (1962) cerL dismissed for mootness, 372 US. 973 (1963); French v. District CL,
153 Colo. 10, 384 P.d 268 (1963) ; People v. English, 31 IlL 2d 301, 201 N.E2d 455 (1964) ;
State v. Hathaway, 161 Me. 255, 211 A.2d 558 (1965); State v. Olson, 274 Minn. 225, 143
N.W2d 69 (1966); Shepard v. Bowe, 250 Ore. 288, 442 P2d 238 (1968); d. Hunt v. State,
248 Ala. 217, 27 So. 2d 186 (1946).
48. People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 397, 39 NE.2d 9259, 928 (1942), quoted in 27 N.Y.2d
at 440, 267 N.E2d at 456, 318 N.YS.2d at 711-12.
49. For discussions of unconstitutional conditions on the exercise of rights see Hale, Un-
constitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 321 (1935); Danforth,
supra note 19, at 500-01; Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 879 (1929);
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595 (1960).
50. See note 46 supra.
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court ignored the connection between capacity and mens rea that it had stressed
earlier 5l' and conditioned the insanity defense upon a waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination.52 In light of Supreme Court decisions holding that
there is a presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right
by an accused, 53 and that a sanction or penalty cannot be imposed upon a
defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right,r it would seem that the
"constructive waiver" avenue of achieving balance at trial", is constitutionally
blocked.
Even accepting the waiver theory, the court's problems do not end here. There
is still the possibility that the defendant may persist in his refusal to cooperate.
Now what? May a defendant be held in contempt; or does he lose his right to
assert his insanity defense; or to introduce certain evidence of his mental con-
dition; or must he now bear the burden of proof as to his insanity? A contempt
order based on the exercise of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion has been held unconstitutional unless accompanied by full immunity with
regard to any crimes disclosed by the defendant's testimony;5 6 and several state
courts have indicated that the defendant cannot be compelled to respond at a
pre-trial mental examination."T Striking the insanity defense deprives the accused
of due process since he is prevented from introducing evidence that would show
he committed no crime.5 8 New York decided to prevent Lee from introducing
any psychiatric evidence on the issue of his mental state at the time of the crime,
but left open the option of introducting non-psychiatric evidence.5 9 But if strik-
51. Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d at 439, 267 N.E.2d at 455-56, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 710;
see note 44 supra and accompanying text.
52. 27 N.Y.2d at 441, 267 N.E.2d at 457, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
53. E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 US. 60 (1942).
54. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) ; cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. At least one commentator has questioned whether "balance of power" at trial is prop-
erly one of the considerations in determining the scope of a constitutional privilege. See 83
Harv. L. Rev., supra note 31, at 667-68; note 46 supra and accompanying text.
56. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964). Of course, it may be argued that if defendant has waived his privilege, Malloy or
Murphy would not apply. However, the severe strain that a contempt citation would place
on the "constructive waiver" theory is suggested by the New York court's refusal to allow
the generally milder sanction of striking the insanity defense. Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27
N.Y.2d at 442, 267 N.E.2d at 457-58, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 713; cf. French v. District Ct., 153
Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963); Haskett v. State, 263 N.E.2d 529 (Ind. 1970).
57. See, e.g., People v. Strong, 114 Cal. App. 522, 300 P. 84 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (after
defendant had in fact answered); People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d 301, 201 N.E. 455 (1964)
(defendant can be compelled to submit to an examination but cannot be compelled to
answer); People v. Dickerson, 164 Mich. 148, 129 N.W. 199 (1910).
58. State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971);
People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949) ; cf. French v.
District Ct., 153 Colo. 10, 384 P.2d 268 (1963) (held no waiver of privilege and found
striking insanity defense improper sanction). But see Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463
(1946). See generally Danforth, supra note 19, at 501; Abolish the Insanity Defense, supra
note 36.
59. 27 N.Y.2d at 442, 267 N.E.2d at 457-58, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 713. For example, relatives
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ing the insanity defense represents an infringement of the defendant's right to
due process, then excluding his most persuasive and pertinent evidence supporting
that defense would appear to be only a slightly less severe infringement of that
same right.60 Furthermore, as noted above,"' this compromise leads to the
paradoxical situation where medical testimony is precluded and non-medical
testimony included.62
Shifting the burden of proof63 might seem a practical compromise, but this
policy would further deny the correlation developed earlier between insanity and
mens rea." It would also favor the defendant of means over the indigent de-
fendant 65 who would find the price of an independent psychiatric examination
prohibitive. Even if the law avoided placing a price upon the exercise of con-
stitutional rights by offering free independent psychiatric consultation to all
defendants,66 the courts would find themselves with a severe case of d6j, vu:
Witnessing again the battle of the psychiatric experts that the pre-trial psy-
chiatric hearing was originally designed to prevent.0 7
and friends of the defendant might testify as to defendants conduct indicating mental dis-
order and to their opinion as to his sanity. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 US. 375, 378-
84 (1966).
60. Defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial includes the right to produce compe-
tent and relevant evidence. E.g., State v. Strasberg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910); 16
Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 579 (1964). The psychiatrist's testimony is both competent
and relevant to the question of the defendant's innocence, and therefore the defendant's right
to due process of law should include the right to produce such testimony.
61. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
62. Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d at 448-49, 267 N.E.2d at 461-62, 318 N.Y.S.2d at
719 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
63. See Krash, supra note 15, at 921 n.80; Note, Pre-Trial Mental Examination and Com-
mitment: Some Procedural Problems in the District of Columbia, 51 Geo. L.J. 143, 154-55
(1962) [hereinafter cited as 51 Geo. Lj.l; cf. State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d
458 (1966) (holding the defendant would be entitled to the benefit of the ALI test rather
than M'Naghten if the defendant accepted the burden of proof). Placing the burden of
proof on the defendant was upheld against constitutional attack in Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790 (1952). Contra, People ex rel. Juhan v. District Ct., 165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741
(1968) (en banc), holding that a statute imposing the burden of proof as to insanity upon
the defendant was violative of the state constitution which provided: "No person shall be
deprived of live, liberty or property, without due process of law." Colo. Const. art. 2, § 25;
accord, US. Const. amend. V.
64. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
65. For discussions of problems of examinations peculiar to the indigent defendant see
Goldstein & Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1061 (1962); Lewin, Indigency-Informal and Formal Procedures to Provide
Partisan Psychiatric Assistance to the Poor, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 458, 479-80 (1966); 51 Geo. L.T.
supra note 63, at 157-64; Note, Criminal Law: Indigent Defendant's Right to Independent
Psychiatrist, 7 Tulsa L.J. 137 (1971);
66. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1971); 18 A.L.R.3d 1074, 1091 (1968).
67. See jessner v. State, 202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634, (1930); Weihofen, Eliminating the
Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 961 (1950); cf. Kuh, The
Insanity Defense-An Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 771 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Kuhl.
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It might be argued that the defendant has caused all of these difficulties by
his failure to cooperate and that, since he is responsible, some penalty should be
assessed against him to restore the balance at trial. However, this statement
refutes itself-how can a defendant be presumed "responsible" for his non-
cooperation when the very purpose of the examination may be to determine his
competence to make such decisions, and he may not even be "responsible" for
the criminal acts charged? Furthermore, the non-cooperation itself might be
evidence of mental incapacity as well as evidence of malingering. 8
At present it would seem that the collision of the pre-trial sanity examination
and the fifth amendment has not yet produced a new synthesis of psychiatry and
law, or even a valid compromise, but rather a series of accommodations flawed
with constitutional and practical difficulties.
2. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The sixth amendment guarantees the right to counsel in a criminal case.00 In
United States v. Wade70 the Supreme Court held that such right obtained at any
critical "stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where...
the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right
to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses
against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself."71
Though the courts have usually rejected the right of a defendant to have
counsel present at a pre-trial mental examination, 2 recent decisions have been
more responsive,73 and it is certainly possible to view the pre-trial insanity
68. See Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d at 448-49, 267 N.E.2d at 462, 318 N.Y.S,2d
at 719 (dissenting opinion) ; Krash, supra note 15, at 919. Of course, the defendanit may also
be acting on the advice of counsel, or his malingering may be evidence of sanity.
69. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defence." US. Const. amend. VI. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US.
458 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
70. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
71. Id. at 226-27.
72. United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 787 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971);
United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 (1970);
United States ex rel. Wax v. Pate, 409 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Albright,
388 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir. 1968) (presence of third party in legal and non-medical capacity
would severely limit the efficacy of the examination; United States v. Fletcher, 329 F. Supp,
160 (D.D.C. 1971); Timmons v. Peyton, 240 F. Supp. 749, 753 (ED. Va. 1965), rev'd on
other grounds, 360 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 960 (1966) (state mental in-
stitutions cannot, by the presence of attorneys, be thwarted in their efforts to accomplish the
purpose of intelligent examinations); In re Spencer, 63 Cal. 2d 400, 406 P.2d 33, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 783 (1965) (presence of counsel not constitutionally required so long as defendant Is
represented by counsel, and testimony of examining psychiatrist is not considered as evidence
of guilt); State v. Snyder, 180 Neb. 787, 146 N.W.2d 67 (1966) (defendant who submits to
or requests examination by court-appointed psychiatrist is not constitutionally entitled to
presence of counsel at examination); State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965)
(trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit counsel to witness the state's
examination).
73. Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, cert. denied,
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examination as a "critical stage" of the prosecution within the meaning of
Wade. In light of the fifth amendment questions discussed above, there is a
basis for viewing the psychiatric examination as a "prosecution" stage since it
can help the government establish the mens rea element of the crime.74 Practi-
cally speaking, there is little doubt that the pre-trial mental examination, whether
for insanity, incompetency, or both, is a crucial stage in the confinement" (if not
"prosecution") of the defendant since the determination here will most likely
account for the ultimate disposition of the defendant. 70
Once again, deciding that a constitutional right obtains necessitates a further
balancing of disciplines. If counsel is to be present in his customary adversary
role, the function of the psychiatric examination will clearly be endangered.1 7
The Lee majority allowed defendant's counsel to be present, but merely as an
observer.78 This avoids a paralysis of the psychiatric interview technique, but to
what extent counsel's silent presence may still impinge somewhat on the inter-
view's effectiveness remains to be seenYO However, the dissenting judges in Lee
evidently felt that the paralysis was legal rather than psychiatric,60 and urged
that, while defendant may have waived his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, he did not waive or limit his equally important sixth amend-
ment right to counsel at the examination.81Though the effects of this legal-psy-
chiatric compromise may not be as devastating as those involving self-incrimina-
tion, it is hardly a satisfactory solution.
404 US. 823 (1971); Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dictum); f.
Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (loth Cir. 1968) (counsel at civil commitment) ; People ex
rel. Woodall v. Bigelow, 20 N.Y.2d 852, 231 NE.2d 777, 285 N.YS.2d 85 (1967) (mem.)
(dvil commitment).
74. As to the psychiatrist hearing being a stage in the prosecution see Lewin, supra note
24, at 245; Comment, Right to Counsel at Pretrial Mental Examination of an Accused, 118
U. Pa. L. Rev. 448, 453-54 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 118 U. Pa. L. Rev.].
75. In this comment "confinement" will refer to the curtailment of defendant's freedom
either in a prison or a mental health institution. "Incarceration" will be used to denote con-
finement in a prison and "commitment" to indicate confinement in a mental health institu-
tion. "Control" will indicate any curtailment of defendant's liberty or restriction on his rights
whether a confinement or not, for example, probation, commitment, or incarceration.
76. "The Supreme Court in Wade used the term 'critical stage of the prosecution' in-
terchangeably with 'critical stages of the proceedings.' Compare [388 US.] at 224, 225."
118 U. Pa. L. Rev., supra note 74, at 455 n.53.
77. See Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (app. Burger, J., dis-
senting) ; State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965).
78. 27 N.Y.2d at 444-45, 267 NE.2d at 459, 318 N.YS.2d at 715. The district attorney
was also allowed to be present. Id.
79. Cf. 118 U. Pa. L. Rev., supra note 74, at 456 (contending that if presence of de-
fendant's psychiatrist creates no problem, presence of counsel likewise would not).
80. For example, counsel as a silent observer is unable to prevent damage at the in-
terview. His role is limited to miniriing the effect of any damaging answers later on.
81. 27 N.Y.2d at 446-47, 267 N.E.2d at 460-61, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 717 (Fuld, C.. &
Burke, J., dissenting in part); Id. at 447-48, 267 N.E2d at 461, 318 N.YS2d at 718
(Breitel, J., dissenting in part).
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Having permitted defendant's counsel to be present at the psychiatric examina-
tion, the Lee court added that it was "only fair to allow the District Attorney
the same right."82 Since the defendant is now in the position of answering
detailed questions about his past history in the presence of a prosecutor and
without the active participation of counsel, further questions of self-incrimina-
tion arise. Even assuming the defendant has waived his privilege with regard to
his mental capacity at the time of the crime charged, has he waived his privilege
with regard to the "fruit" of any leads revealed to the prosecutor at the examina-
tion, or to incriminating admissions concerning events other than the crime
charged?88 The Lee court held that the district attorney would not be permitted
to use the psychiatric examination "as a source of evidence which would be rele-
vant on the issue of guilt."84 Theoretically, this would "poison" any evidentiary
fruit of the psychiatric examination but, like the limiting instruction to the
jury,85 would seem to place the defendant in severe practical danger. The conse-
quence of this holding with regard to crimes other than the one charged is un-
clear.8 6 These problems seem especially relevant considering that the defendant
may be less circumspect in his answers because of his possible mental illness.87
B. Conceptual Infirmities of the Pre-Trial Mental Examination
to Determine Sanity
In addition to the formidable constitutional problems, the current procedure
for resolving an insanity "defense" also suffers from conceptual difficulties.
Simply stated, the crux of this problem is that the defendant who attempts to
show that he is "not guilty" by reason of insanity will usually be confined
whether he is "convicted" or "acquitted."88 Most jurisdictions have statutes
providing for the commitment of those found not guilty by reason of insanity.80
82. Id. at 444, 267 N.E.2d at 459, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
83. CL Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 523, 79 (1964).
84. 27 N.Y.2d at 442, 267 N.E.2d at 457, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
85. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
86. Suppose, for example, a defendant suspected of several crimes is charged with only
one. If he relates information regarding the other crimes to the psychiatrist in the pres-
ence of the prosecutor, will he receive transactional immunity? Will he receive Immunity
from the use of the evidentiary fruits of these statements?
87. Furthermore the defendant, often uneducated, "will seldom understand the far reach-
ing significance of the questions put to him by a trained psychiatrist. Questions calling for
seemingly innocuous answers can be aimed at eliciting the most damaging responses." 51 Geo.
L.J., supra note 63, at 162 (footnote omitted) (quoted in Lee v. Erie County Court, 27
N.Y.2d at 447, 267 N.E.2d at 461, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 717). The defendant may also be under
the influence of drugs. See note 31 supra.
88. E.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20 (McKinney 1971); see Insanity Defense, supra
note 18, at 143, and sources cited in Insanity Defense 260-61 n.1. Brakel & Rock categorize 29
states as providing for mandatory commitment under certain conditions, and an additional
16 states as providing for discretionary commitment. Of the five remaining states, two pro-
vide for commitment in some way, and only three states have no statutory provisions at
all. Brakel & Rock, supra note 2, at 430 Table 11.1.
89. See note 88 supra.
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The defendant's sanity at the time of the crime, therefore, is actually irrelevant
with regard to separating accused persons into traditional categories of "guilty"
or "not guilty", i.e., separating those whom the state has the right to confine
because of their criminal acts from those who must be allowed to go freeY° What
distinction exists between those "convicted" and those "acquitted" by reason of
insanity lies not in the traditional dichotomy of incarceration versus freedom,
but in what type of confinement will be utilized. Currently the defense "dis-
criminate[s] between the cases where a punitive-correctional disposition is ap-
propriate and those in which a inedical-custodiaZ disposition is the only kind that
the law should allow." 91 To say that the medical treatment is not "punishment"
and that the confinement is intended "for the defendant's own good" is to confuse
labels with analysis, and motive with effect. "Commitment procedures, however
labelled, constitute a sanction, so far as the person confined is concerned, in the
form of deprivation of liberty, at least to the extent that commitment is without
regard to his 'wishes.' "92 Commitment to a mental hospital is frequently for a
longer period than the incarceration following a verdict of "Iguilty,0 3 and con-
finement in a mental hospital, even a civil hospital, has been held to be as great
a deprivation of liberty as incarceration in a jail or prison. 4 Since conceptually
the insanity "defense" negates the essential element of mens rea,0 5 and shows
that by definition no crime occurred, what the insanity "defense" really does is
"to authorize the state to hold those 'who must be found not to possess the guilty
mind mens rea,' even though the criminal law demands that no person be held
criminally responsible if doubt is cast on any material element of the offense
charged." 96
Since it is quite reasonable to control, and perhaps confine, persons who have
performed acts proscribed by the criminal law (the actus reus) even though (or
perhaps, especially if) their acts were the product of mental illness, it would
seem logical to alter the conceptions of criminal responsibility rather than to
eliminate control of those who assert the insanity "defense." As it now stands,
the traditional concepts of "guilty" and "innocent" no longer are able to perform
the function that society and the law require of them. A defendant may be quite
"innocent" in both a moral and legal sense and still be a proper subject for
governmental confinement or control.
Despite the conceptual contradictions outlined above, it may still be argued
that, in practice, the present structure of the insanity issue performs a valuable
function in that it does separate defendants into two categories for disposition:
90. See Abolish the Insanity Defense, supra note 36, at 864.
91. Model Penal Code § 4.01, Comment at 156 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956) (emphasis
added).
92. Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness Some Observations on the De-
cision to Release Persons Acquitted By Reason of Insanity, 70 Yale LJ. 225, 229 (1960).
93. See Readings, supra note 1, at 383; T. Szasz, Psychiatric justice 23 (1965) (in-
dicating psychiatric treatment can be a "life sentence.")
94. Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
95. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
96. Abolish the Insanity Defense, supra note 36, at 864.
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those who will receive "punitive-correctional" confinement and those who will
receive "medical-custodial" confinement. However, it is questionable whether a
jury is the proper arbiter of this decision,0 7 and whether the decision should
hinge upon the current definitions of legal insanity. The issue of "insanity" is
really one of "sentencing": 98 Will the aims of society, including the rehabilita-
tion of the defendant, be better served by "punitive-correctional" confinement,
by "medical-custodial" confinement or by some other form of control?
Moreover, the conceptual maze surrounding the insanity defense is further
confounded by the fact that a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity may
find himself in the same institutional facility as a defendant who is found guilty
and then thought to be in need of mental care.99 This may be determined by the
crime charged,100 a finding of dangerousness,101 or a statutory authorization of
confinement in either mental health or correction facilities.10 2 For example, in
New York a defendant who is acquitted by reason of insanity is not only liable
to confinement despite his "acquittal," but is also liable for confinement in a
"punitive-correctional" facility if he is found to be "dangerously mentally ill.))103
While this result may be reasonable, conceptually and practically it would seem
to make a charade of the jury deliberations on the issue of legal insanity. In a
significant number of cases, the defendant will eventually be placed in the same
confinement facility no matter how the jury determining guilt or innocence
decides the issue of mental disorder.
C. Constitutional Infirmities of the Pre-Trial Mental
Examination to Determine Competency
As mentioned above, defendant's mental condition at the time of the
crime charged and his competency to stand trial are frequently evaluated at the
97. See Kuh, supra note 67, at 790-95, 813-15, for a cogent analysis of the function of
the jury with regard to the insanity issue under modem criminal procedure.
98. See text accompanying note 170 infra.
99. See Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, in The Mentally in and the
Right to Treatment, 109, 115 (G. Morris ed. 1970).
100. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 71-2-2 (1963).
101. E.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20(6) (McKinney 1971); N.Y. Mental Hygiene
Law § 85 (McKinney 1971).
102. E.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 607:3 (Supp. 1967) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4805 (1958).
103. See note 101 supra. "If the commissioner [of Mental Hygiene] is of the opinion
that the defendant is dangerously mentally ill, he may transfer him to an appropriate In-
stitution operated by the department of correction in the manner prescribed by section
eighty-five . . . of the mental hygiene law." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20(6) (McKinney
1971). Under section 85, the defendant would be entitled to a hearing on the Issue of his
dangerousness but is not entitled to a jury determination of that issue. N.Y. Mental Hygiene
Law § 85(4) (McKinney 1971). He is, however, entitled to a rehearing and review of the
court's determination of his dangerousness, and this review is tried before a jury. Id. The
initial finding of dangerousness cannot authorize retaining the defendant in the depart-
ment of correction institution for more than six months. Id. § 85(4). Extensions may be
sought if the defendant remains dangerous, but these extensions are subject to the same
procedural safeguards as the original authorization. Id. § 85(4-a). The first extension can-
not be for more than one year and subsequent extensions cannot be for more than two
years. Id. §§ 73-74.
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same examinationYz 'o Thus, when an insanity defense is interposed, a pre-trial
mental examination triggers the full range of constitutional problems discussed
above, whether it is denominated an "incompetency" examination or an "in-
sanity" examination. Any solution to the problems of the insanity defense
which does not also effectively deal with the issues involved in the far more
prevalent pre-trial competency examination will be a "paper" solution only.
In addition to these considerable difficulties, the pre-trial mental examination
to determine defendant's competency has considerable problems in its own right.
Whether or not the defendant is competent to stand trial should rest on his
ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and whether he
is able to assist in his defense in a rational manner. 08 One of the practical
problems with the pre-trial competency examination is that the examining person-
nel sometimes apply the legal insanity standard rather than the competency
standard.10 6 If the defendant is found incompetent to stand trial he is placed in
the custody of a mental institution until such time as he is capable of standing
trial. At this point it must be remembered that the defendant has merely been
charged with a crime; there has been no judicial investigation or determination
of his commission of a crime. Also, the incompetency examination may be the
result of a prosecution motion,'0 7 or the court's own motion,' 08 as well as a
defense motion.' 0 9 As a result, it is possible for a defendant to be confined
pursuant to a prosecution motion?"0 for a pre-trial mental examination, even
though he is innocent of the overt acts constituting the crime charged. He will
also be confined despite the prosecution's inability to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt all the elements of the crime charged"
104. See 51 Geo. LJ., supra note 63, at 144-45.
105. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
106. Lewin, supra note 24, at 239. "Although courts pay lip service to the distinction
between the fact of mental illness and the legal conclusion of mental incompetency, this
distinction is seldom actually kept." Id. This may be because the court has not made dear
exactly what standard should be applied, or because the examiner does not understand
whatever standard the court has articulated, or because the medical examiner is influenced in
his decision by his belief that the defendant is a more fit subject for mental "treatment" than
correctional 'treatment" See id. at 237-43; Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial:
A Checkist for Psychiatrists, 122 Am. J. Psychiatry 616 (1965); Vann & Morganroth,
Psychiatrists and the Competence to Stand Trial, 42 U. Det U. 5 (1964); 59 Mlich. L.
Rev., supra note 23, at 1081-83. See also 51 Geo. L.J, supra note 63, at 169-74.
107. See Winn v. United States, 270 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
108. E.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.30 (McKinney 1971).
109. For a discussion of the role of defense counsel with regard to the motion for a
hearing on the incompetency of a defendant see Lewin, supra note 24, at 244-57.
110. Several commentators have spotlighted the tendency of prosecutor's to use the in-
competency issue as a strategic weapon leading to the disposition of the criminal charges
without trial since a finding of incompetency leads to confinement. See, eg., Lewin, supra note
24, at 257-69; Slovenko, Psychiatry, Criminal Law, and the Role of the Psychlatrist 1963
Duke LJ. 395, 412. The prosecution may also move for an incompetency examination as a
tactic to gain information to help it rebut an anticipated insanity defense. Krash, supra note
15, at 911; Lewin 272-74.
111. See Foote, supra note 19, at 846 (Professor Foote's article seems to be the
germinal one with regard to the reform of competency procedures). The defendant may
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In most instances the resulting confinement is indeterminate-being measured
solely by an improvement in the defendant's mental competency. 112 Though the
measuring rod should be the defendant's ability to effectively participate in his
defense against the crime charged, it frequently is the much broader test of
whether the defendant has recovered from any mental illness from which he
suffers.'-" Thus, the same confusion of standards occurring at the original com-
petency examination follows the institutionalized defendant and prevents him
from returning for trial." 4 Furthermore, as several commentators have pointed
out, the prospect of facing trial once recovered is not conducive to the incom-
petent defendant's mental improvement." 0
These factors and the general difficulty of treating mental illness1 combine
to encroach upon the defendant's rights to a speedy trial and due process of law.
His confinement may never end." 7 If it does, it will likely be years before he is
brought to trial,1 8 and in the interim he will have been confined without the
government's ever proving that he has done something to forfeit his freedom
also be prevented from asserting any legal defense that he might have to the crime such as
suppression of evidence or statute of limitations. E.g., United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp.
60 (S.D. Cal. 1959), in which a military court which convicted four defendants of murder was
declared without jurisdiction ten years later. The defendants were then indicted by the
civilian government but the court found that the ten year delay constituted a denial of the
right to a speedy trial as to three of the defendants and their cases were dismissed. The fourth
defendant was returned to an institution for the criminally insane on the grounds that he was
not competent to participate in the proceedings, i.e., in the dismissal. There was no finding
that he was dangerous. New York has moved to remedy this situation somewhat: An
incapacitated person "may make any motion authorized by this chapter which is susceptible
of fair determination without his personal participation." N.Y. Civ. Proc. Law § 730.60(5)
(McKinney 1971). Accord, Model Penal Code § 4.06(3) "(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Though an improvement, the statute's emphasis on the defendant's "personal participation"
would seem to make the provision subject to the same criticism discussed above with regard
to the general doctrine of incompetency. See text accompanying notes 120-22 infra.
112. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1370 (West Supp. 1968); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§ 730.60(2) (McKinney 1971). New York has recently placed a limitation on the confine-
ment of an incompetent defendant. See note 119 infra.
113. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 783.3 (Supp. 1972).
114. See Hess & Thomas, supra note 19, at 713-20; Lewin, supra note 24, at 263-65;
Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty, and the Law, 13 Kan. L. Rev. 59, 70 (1964); 59
Mich. L. Rev., supra note 25, at 1084-86.
115. See Engelberg, Pre-Trial Criminal Commitment to Mental Institutions: The Pro-
cedure in Massachusetts and Suggested Reforms, 17 Cath. L. Rev. 163, 189 (1967); Lewln,
supra note 24, at 243; 59 Mich. L. Rev., supra note 25, at 1093.
116. See Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 Crim. L. Bull. 101, 125 n.79 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Ennis].
117. Hess & Thomas, supra note 19, at 713-15 (over half the persons committed to the
Michigan State Hospital at Ionia will spend the rest of their lives there).
118. In 1965, nearly twenty percent of the 1,040 inmates committed to Matteawan as
incompetent to stand trial had spent twenty years at the institution with charges still pending.
Mental Illness, Due Process (1968), supra note 25, at 214-15 Table 8. See also Insanity De-
fense, supra note 18, at 147-70.
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and entitle society to exert its power over him. Finally, the confinement resulting
from his incompetency may in fact be longer than his sentence would have been
had he been found both competent and guilty.110
The justification asserted for all of this is that it is basically unfair to try a
defendant who does not have sufficient capacity to properly assist in his own
defense, and therefore the trial of such a defendant would be in violation of his
right to due process. 20 However, nothing seems clearer than the fact that a de-
fendant's right to due process is violated not by trial but by conviction.'-' It is
very difficult to see the violation of due process in trying the defendant and find-
ing him not guilty, either because the prosecution is unable to make its case
against him beyond a reasonable doubt, or because he has a valid defense to the
charge. The violation of due process will only occur in those cases in which the
prosecution is able to secure a conviction. Concentrating its sole attention on the
latter of these two possibilities, the law "protects" the defendant by confining
him indefinitely in a situation where any improvement in his mental condition
results not in freedom but in a trial with the attendant possibility of further
confinement in another institution. While his rights are being thus protected, the
defendant runs the risk that the delay in his trial may dissipate the availability
of witnesses and beneficial testimony that would be accessible to him with a
speedy tria.'2 Once again, the meeting of law and psychiatrym seems to pro-
duce conceptual and practical contradictions.
119. Ennis, supra note 116, at 120; 59 Mich. L. Rev., supra note 25, at 108-89; Note
Hospitalization of Mentally Mll Criminals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 110 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 78, 91 (1961). See examples noted in United States ex re. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F2d
1071, 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 US. 847 (1969). The New York Criminal Procedure
Law which went into effect in 1971 has acted to meet this problem by providing that the
aggregate commitment '"must not exceed two-thirds of the authorized maximum term of
imprisonment for the highest class felony charged in the indictment or for the highest cls
felony of which [defendant] was convicted." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730.S0(3) (McKinney
1971). This provision is either ineffective or unclear in its application with regard to an
incompetent who is charged with a class A felony since the maximum term in this category
is life imprisonment. N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00-2(a) (McKinney 1967).
120. See, e.g, Pate v. Robinson, 383 US. 375 (1966); United States v. Gundelfinger, 93 F.
Supp. 630-31 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Brakel & Rock, supra note 2, at 403, 422; Eizenstat, supra
note 19, at 379; 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 62 (1965).
121. Cf. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
122. For cases dealing with the issue of speedy trial for an incompetent defendant see
Marshall v. United States, 337 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d
19 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (7 year delay because of defendant's incompetency held violative of right
to speedy trial); United States ex rel. Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (twenty-five months at a federal
prison facility without treatment held violative of defendant's constitutional rights); Wieter
v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo. 1961) ; People v. Delfs, 31 lmc 2d 655, 220 N.Y.S.2d
535 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1961); cf. United States ex rel. Hill v. Johnston, 321 F.
Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (dictum). In United States ex rel. Daniels v. Johnston, 328 F.
Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court rejected a speedy trial argument on behalf of an
incompetent defendant who had been confined over eight years but found that the defendant
had been denied substantive due process of law and had been denied equal protection of
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III Tmn Bim'tcAmT TRm
A. The Traditional Procedure
The "traditional" bifurcated trial is perhaps best exemplified by the Cali-
fornia procedure.'2 Originally introduced to reduce the possibility of confusing
and sidetracking the jury with the psychiatric testimony necessitated by the
insanity defense, 125 the procedure calls for a split trial: the first trial120 on the
the law. As to the speedy trial contention the court held that a delay in trial occasioned by
mental incompetence does not deprive the defendant of his sixth amendment right to speedy
trial. United States v. Smalls, 438 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971);
United States ex rel. Thomas v. Pate, 351 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
962 (1966); United States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1966); Howard v. United
States 261 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1958); Germany v. Hudspeth, 209 F.2d 15 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 946 (1954); Barfield v. Settle, 209 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
123. Several commentators have suggested that there is no special reason to consult
psychiatrists on the issue of incompetence to stand trial and that the Issue might be better
determined by a jury, the court, or defense counsel. See T. Szasz, Psychiatric justice, 255-59
(1965); Ennis, supra note 116, at 119; Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty, and the
Law, 13 U. Kan. L. Rev. 59, 69-70 (1964). But see 81 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 19, at 469.
No attempt is made in this comment to analyze this issue.
124. Cal. Penal Code § 1026 (West 1970). The split trial was held not violative of duo
process in People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 256 P.2d 911, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953).
An early Wisconsin version of the split trial was upheld in Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14
N.W. 912 (1883). Other states also have statutory split trial procedures on the Issue of In-
sanity. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-8-1 to 39-8-4 (1964); Tex. Code Crim, Proc. art.
46.02 (Supp. 1971). Arizona operated under a statute authorizing a bifurcated trial (Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1621.01 (Supp. 1971)) until the recent case of State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz.
103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971), which found the procedure
authorized by the statute to be a violation of due process of law. See text accompanying
note 140 infra. Other jurisdictions have judicially implemented bifurcated trials. E.g., Holmes
v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (construing the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the court held the issue of bifurcation to be essentially one of controlling the
submission of the issues to the jury-part of court's common-law rights); State ex rel. La
Follette v. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967) (a defendant who can show
incriminating responses to examiner's questions at court ordered mental examination is
entitled to a sequential order of proof on the issues of guilt and insanity in spite of statutory
language authorizing only unitary trial). Louisiana abandoned a bifurcated trial In 1932,
evidently because of the burden of selecting a double jury in non-populous regions. See
Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Procedure-A Critical Appraisal, 14 La. L. Rev. 11, 22-23
(1953). For a discussion of the bifurcated trial procedures existing in the various states in
1961 see Louiseil & Hazard, supra note 36, at 824-29.
Split trials or their equivalent are also used in areas of law other than the insanity defense.
Insurance coverage is sometimes tried separately from the issue of negligence or damages; a
reversal which grants a new trial on one issue while affirming another creates a split trial;
evidence of prior convictions is frequently segregated from the issue of guilt under statutes
imposing a greater sentence for recidivists. See State ex rel. La Follette v. Raskin, 34 WIs. 2d
607, 615, 150 N.W.2d 318, 322 (1967).
125. See Louisell & Hazard, supra note 36, at 806-08.
126. If incompetent, the defendant does not go to trial, just as under the unitary system.
Cal. Penal Code § 1368 '(West 1970).
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issue of defendant's guilt, excluding the issue of his possible insanity; and the
second trial on the issue of insanity."- Besides the advantage of avoiding jury
confusion by trying issues unrelated to the psychiatric testimony first, the split
trial also affords more protection to the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 2 8 Since psychiatric testimony will not be introduced
in the first trial, there is no danger that the jury will consider testimonial ad-
missions made by the defendant in the psychiatric interview. The jury must be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the other available evidence
that the defendant committed the overt act charged and that he possessed the
requisite intent (apart from insanity). When the psychiatric testimony is intro-
duced at the second trial, there has already been a showing that, but for the
insanity defense, defendant would be convicted.
Of course, even at this point there is still a sacrifice of the self-incrimination
privilege since defendant's admissions to the psychiatrist may be used to help
convince the jury that he is not legally insane-that he was capable of entertain-
ing the required mens rea.129 But the compromise here is held to a minimum,
given the connection between mens rea and the commission of crime as currently
defined.
Though the bifurcated trial procedure offers relief from some of the problems
besetting pre-trial mental examinations, it has problems of its own. The connec-
tion between mens rea and psychiatric testimony of an impaired mental state
still haunts the procedure in certain cases, as was amply demonstrated by the
California decision of People v. Wells'30 and the recent Arizona decision of State
127. In other jurisdictions the order of the two issues has sometimes been the reves of
the California procedure, i.e., a determination of sanity first and guilt second. Er, Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-8-4 (1963). If this order is followed it would exacerbate the self-
incrimination problems unless separate juries were used. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-8-4(2)
(1963), providing for a different jury at the second trial. Cf. French v. State, 85 Wi1s. 400,
55 N.W. 566, (1893). But cf. Schissler v. State, 122 Wis. 365, 99 N.W. 593 (1904). See also
State ex rel. La Follette v. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 616-18, 150 N.W.2d 318, 323-24 (1967)
(providing a concise summary of the tortuous history of the bifurcated trial in Wisconsin).
More fundamentally, trying the insanity issue first would work a gross violation of due
process if a defendant found insane at the time of the alleged offense could be committed on
that finding alone, without a trial on the merits or a plea of guilty to the crime charged. See
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-8-4(2) (1963). The status of mental illness is not itself an
offense. People v. English, 31 Ill. 2d 301, 201 N.E2d 455 (1964).
128. State ex rel. La Follette v. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 622-23, 150 N.W.2d 318, 326
(1967); Dix, Mental lness, Criminal Intent, And the Bifurcated Trial, 1970 Law and the
Social Order 559, 573-75 [hereinafter cited as Dix]; 51 Geo. L.J., supra note 63, at 155-56;
Comment, Compulsory Mental Examinations and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
1964 Wis. L. Rev. 671, 681.
129. See Lee v. Erie County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318 N.YS.2d 70S, cert.
denied, 404 US. 823 (1971); Danforth, supra note 19, at 496-98; 51 Geo. LJ., supra note
63, at 156, 83 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 31, at 649 & 661 n.89.
130. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949). The problems pre-
sented by the Wells decision have been emphasized in Louisell & Hazard, supra note 36.
However, the publication of this cogent indictment of the split trial procedure antedates the
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v. Shaw.131 The Wells decision held that evidence of mental impairment was ad-
missable in the first trial on the issue of "guilt" when offered to disprove that the
defendant had the required specific' 82 intent at the time of the crime,188 If the
crime charged was defined in terms of a special mental state,184 therefore, much
of the testimony that would have otherwise been excluded by the bifurcated trial
was now admitted to show that the defendant did not in fact entertain that spe-
cial state of mind. However, if the evidence tended to show that the defendant
was not capable of forming a criminal intent at the time, this testimony would
still be excluded from the first trial and reserved for presentation at the second
trial on the issue of insanity.les
Justice Carter dissented in Wells, urging that it is logical contradiction to
exclude testimony that defendant couldn't have committed the crime but to
allow testimony tending to show a partial impairment of his capacity to commit
a crime.' 86 While this criticism avoids the fact that the defendant is only pre-
vented from offering evidence of total incapacity at the first trial and will be
allowed to present it at the second, it does point to the objection that the
evaluation of the testimony will be different at each trial'8 7 and that the line of
application of the fifth amendment to the states, and the article ignores the beneficial effect
of the split trial on problems of self incrimination.
131. 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971), dIscussed in
Dix, supra note 128, at 561.
132. "Some crimes require a specified intention in addition to the intentional doing of the
actus reus itself,-an intent specifically required for guilt of the particular offense, as In
larceny, burglary, assault with intent to commit murder, using the mails with intent to
defraud, or criminal attempt." Perkins, supra note 20, at 762 (emphasis deleted) (footnotes
omitted). As used by the court in Wells, "specific intent" refers not only to this type of intent
but also to the mental states of malice aforethought and premeditation. 33 Cal. 2d at 343,
202 P.2d at 61. Perkins suggests the term "special mental element" be used as inclusive of
"specific intent" as described above, and any other mental requirement which is different
from, and generally greater than, the intent to perform the actus reus, such as malice afore-
thought. Perkins 751. In the interest of greater precision "special mental element" will be
used here. See Perkins 750-51, 762-64.
133. 33 Cal. 2d at 350-51, 202 P.2d at 66. Wells, a prisoner, had been convicted under a
California statute providing the death penalty for assaults by prisoners under life sentence.
The statute called for a showing that the circumstances attending the assualt indicated
"malice aforethought" and evidence of Wells' mental condition at the time of the assault
was introduced and characterized as indicating that Wells did not in fact entertain the
required intent but rather was motivated by unreasonable fear. Id. at 356-57, 202 P.2d at 69.
134. See note 132 supra.
135. 33 Cal. 2d at 350-51, 202 P.2d at 66.
136. Id. at 360, 202 P.2d at 71-72 (Carter, J., dissenting).
137. It is quite probable that there is a "gap" between the two trials. Evidence inadmissible
at the first trial because it is of that type which tends to show that defendant could not
have entertained the required intent may not be enough to satisfy the jury at the second
trial that the defendant meets the M7Naghten criterion of legal insanity. However, If this
evidence were considered on the issue of special mental state, it might have been persuasive
enough to convince the jury that, while defendant was not legally insane, he did not enter-
tain the special mental state. So, while it may be true that defendant will get his evidence
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demarcation between the two types of psychiatric evidence is certainly very
hard to trace.1 38 Also, admitting such evidence would create duplication of effort,
and defeat the original purpose of clarifying the issues for the jury. "'
Excluding evidence of partial mental impairment in the first trial would restore
the clean severance of issues. But in State v. Shaw'40 the Supreme Court of
Arizona held that this would deprive the defendant of due process-it would
inhibit him from showing that he did not commit the crime because he did not
have the requisite intent.1 4' The Shaw court rejected the Wells distinction be-
tween psychiatric evidence showing lack of intent on a particular occasion and
that showing incapacity for intent on that occasion.' 42 It concluded that the
Arizona legislature's intent would be thwarted by the introduction of psychiatric
evidence at the first trial.' 43 Since enforcing the legislative intent would exclude
the evidence and thus violate due process, the court declared the Arizona bi-
furcated trial statute unconstitutionalY.44 Again, it is the connection between
defendant's mental condition and the definition of crime that hinders the full
effectiveness of the bifurcated trial.
However, there is a split in authority throughout the country on the control-
ling issues in the Wells and Shaw decisions. Some jurisdictions do not admit
evidence probative of mental disorder except to show full incapacity relieving
defendant completely from responsibility for the crime charged.' 45 The consti-
tutionality of rejecting evidence probative of mental disorder as irrelevant except
as it applies to the issue of legal insanity was upheld in Fisher v. United States.j40
This rule is characterized as a rejection of the doctrine of "diminished capacity,"
but since such a rule is usually interpreted as rejecting more than is implied in
the term "diminished capacity,"' 47 it might be clearer to refer to this rule as
the Fisher rule.' 48 In a jurisdiction operating under the Fisher rule, the argu-
considered at one of the two trials, each trial will consider such psychiatric evidence on differ-
ent issues. The logic of the Wells decision seems to presume that evidence tending to prove
total incapacity and evidence tending to indicate a factual lack of the special mental state
in the particular case are mutually exclusive categories.
138. See Louisell & Hazard, supra note 36, at 822, 830.
139. Id. at 829-30.
140. 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
141. Id. at 112, 471 P.2d at 724.
142. Id. at 110-11, 471 P.2d at 722-23.
143. Id. at 113, 471 P.2d at 725.
144. Id.
145. See 22 A.L.3d 1228 (1968); Brakel & Rock, supra note 2, at 392-96; Perkins, supra
note 20, at 881-82.
146. 328 U.S. 463 (1946).
147. See Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 435 Pa. 104, 253 A2d 644 (1969) ; Curl v. State, 40
Wis. 2d 474, 485-86, 162 N.W.2d 77, 83 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1004 (1969). Dix, supma
note 128, at 560 n.7.
148. Given the present structure and terminology of the criminal law, evidence of defen-
dant's mental disorder might be introduced for a variety of purposes: (1) to show that
defendant did not have the capacity to commit the crime because his mental disorder pre-
vented him from forming the general mens rea or guilty mind required. This is the insanity
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ments for the introduction of psychiatric evidence at the first trial could be
rejected and a bifurcated trial procedure would not suffer the partial loss of
effectiveness that has resulted from the Wells decision in California."49
It is submitted, however, that the Wells decision is correct and that the
effectiveness of the bifurcated trial procedure should not be increased at the
expense of the defendant's right to due process. There are other methods of
reconciling this tension. The California decisions which have partially reduced
the effectiveness of the bifurcated trial procedure have involved a statute which
required the prosecution to prove a special state of mind--"premeditation," or
"malice aforethought." 150 These special states of mind require something more
than the general mens rea element of most crimes, and more than a specific
intent as the intent to kill.r" By contrast, New York's penal code has elimi-
defense and the evidence offered will be tested against the jurisdiction's definition of criminal
responsibility, e.g., M'Naghten, etc. Some courts hold that this is the only issue to which
evidence of mental disorder is relevant. See Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). Thus,
the Fisher rnile creates an "all or nothing" proposition with regard to evidence of mental
disorder and phrases the issue in terms of capacity. (2) To show that the defendant, while he
may have the capacity to form the general mens rea with respect to the crime in question and
therefore is responsible to the criminal law, was incapable of forming the special
mental state required for the crime charged. See Becksted v. People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d
189 (1956). "Diminished capacity" can reduce the charge and is phrased in terms of defen-
dant's capacity. (3) To show that while defendant is capable of forming the general mens
rea required, and is capable of forming the special state of mind required for a certain degree
of the crime, he did not in fact have that special state of mind though he did have the
general mens rea. E.g., People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949); Fox. v. State,
73 Nev. 241, 316 P.2d 924 (1957). Under the Wells view, the defendant is still held for some
crime but the evidence is treated as negating intent rather than capacity. (4) To show that
defendant, while he may or may not be capable of forming the general mens ra required,
did not in fact have that state of mind at the time in question. Cf. State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz.
103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971). Under the Shaw rule the
evidence of mental disorder is seen as negating intent rather than capacity. Therefore it may
not be tested by the jurisdiction's definition of criminal responsibility and might, in the ab-
sence of some intervening procedure or doctrine, lead to complete freedom. (5) To show that,
while defendant may be capable of forming the general mens rea required and the special
state of mind required, and did in fact have that special state of mind, his punishment
should be lessened because of evidence probative of a mental disorder. Cf., eg., State v.
Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965); Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 435 Pa. 104, 253
A.2d 644 (1969). See generally 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968).
149. Cf. Curl v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 474, 485-86, 162 N.W.2d 77, 83 (1968).
150. Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 189 & 4500 (West Supp. 1971 & West 1970). See People v.
Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911 (1966); People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d
492 (1959) ; People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949);
People v. Webb, 143 Cal. App. 2d 402, 300 P.2d 130 (1956).
151. Whereas "premeditation" can be designated an additional requirement to the general
mens rea element without much difficulty, "malice aforethought" is usually discussed by legal
commentators as being satisfied by an intent to inflict great bodily injury, e.g., Perkins, supra
note 20, at 36, or an intent to do something unlawful, as opposed to "Ill will." See Purver,
The Language of Murder, 14 U.C.L.AL. Rev. 1306 (1967). While a discussion of "malice
aforethought" is clearly beyond the scope of this comment, it may be noticed that the Wells
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nated the gradations of first and second degree murder and has eliminated
the ambiguous language of "premeditation" and "malice aforethought" in de-
fining the mens rea requirement for murder 52 This new definition would reduce
the tension between due process and a bifurcated trial in New York since the
capacity to commit murder-to form an intent to cause death-would be identi-
cal with the New York criterion for mental disorder as a defense.lro Except
through legal fiction, there is no such identity under statutes such as California's:
A defendant might be capable of forming an intent to cause death but not
capable of "premeditation," or "malice aforethought," or some other special
mental state. The distinction in Wells (between capacity to form and the factual
existence of a culpable mental state) was applied to special states of mind.
By eliminating "premeditation" and "malice aforethought" and using only a
specific intent, such as intent to cause death, the pertinence of the Wels dis-
tinction is considerably reduced, if not obviated, since the required mental state
has lost most of its "specialness."
As a possible due process violation, such a definition would leave only the
argument apparently accepted in State v. Shaw,' " that psychiatric evidence
is relevant to indicate lack of the general mens rea element. However, to con-
sider this contention as charging a deficiency peculiar to the bifurcated trial is
misleading. Due process requires that evidence tending to show that defendant's
conduct and state of mind did not correspond to the definition of the crime
charged should be considered on the issue of whether or not a crime was corn-
court spoke of this element as a "specific!' intent (33 Cal. 2d 350, 202 Pad at 65) and
apparently distinguished assault (see Cal. Penal Code § 240 (West 1970)) from assault with
malice aforethought in the case of a prisoner for life. See Cal. Penal Code § 4500 (West
1970). However, assault also requires "intent," though not a "special intent?' People v.
Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 228 P.2d 281 (1951). If simple assault requires only a general mans
rea in connection with an attempt to inflict bodily injury, and malice aforethought requires
an intent to inflict great bodily injury, there is a difference between the two intents involved.
But Wells offered psychiatric evidence tending to show that he had an unreasonable fear of
being attacked. This type of evidence would distinguish between malice aforethought and
simple intent only if malice aforethought included something like "ill will."
152. Compare Law of July 26, 1881, ch. 680, § 184, 3 [1881] N.Y. Laws 104th Sess. 44,
and Law of June 30, 1882, ch. 384, § 183, [1882] N.Y. Laws 105th Sess. 541, with N.Y. Penal
Code § 125.25 (McKinney 1967); cf. N.Y. Penal Code § 15.05 (McKinney 1967). See also
Purver, The Language of Murder, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1306, 1311 (1967).
153. N.Y. Penal Law § 30.05 (McKinney 1967); see note 20 supra.
154. 106 Ariz. 103, 471 Pad 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971). "To prohibit
the introduction of any or all the evidence bearing on proof of insanity at the trial of guilt
or innocence would deprive a defendant of the opportunity of rebutting intent, premeditation,
and malice, because an insane person could have none." Id. at 112, 471 P.d at 724. Whether
the court intended its argument to apply to evidence introduced to negate general mens ma,
and thus show defendant to be not guilty, or to apply only to evidence introduced to reduce
the degree of the crime, is not clear. "There is no provision [at the second trial], nor
realistically could there be, to determine also intent, premeditation, or malice in reduction
of the degree of the crime." Id. In the discussion in the text, Shaw is considered authority
for the broader holding: Evidence of insanity can negate general mens rea. See text accom-
panying note 140 supra.
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mitted.155As long as evidence is considered on all issues to which it is relevant,
there is no violation of due process merely because the consideration was
bifurcated.150 If evidence is introduced that is probative of incapacity to com-
mit crime because of mental disorder, it is, in effect, being considered also on
the issue of defendant's factual state of mind at the time of the alleged crime,
because a factual lack of intent follows logically from the defendant's incapacity.
Since "lack of capacity" would seem to be a term coined to indicate the factual
lack of mens rea because of mental disorder, the reverse should also be true:
Evidence probative of a factual lack of mens rea because of mental disorder is
also considered on the defendant's capacity to commit crime.
Under current law, the great differences between considering the evidence of
mental disorder at the first trial, on the issue of whether defendant in fact
harbored the requisite general mens rea; or at the second trial, as to whether
he was capable of harboring it, is that different standards may be used in in-
terpreting the evidence in each case and that different verdicts might follow
a successful defense in each case. The former may be considered without rela-
tion to some particular "test" and may lead to a verdict of simply not guilty
if successful, whereas the latter would be considered in relation to the jurisdic-
tion's test of incapacity (M'Naghten, etc.) and would lead to not guilty by
reason of insanity if successful. 157 The not guilty would presumably lead to
freedom while the not guilty by reason of insanity would usually lead to con-
finement. 58 But these results also follow from a unitary procedure. Evidence
of mental disorder introduced to show defendant did not in fact have the
requisite intent is tested against the jurisdiction's standard of incapacity and,
if persuasive, leads to a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict and confinement.
Thus, the "intent-in-fact versus incapacity" argument, rather than indicating
a peculiar liability of the bifurcated procedure, challenges the standards of
mental disorder as a defense and the authorization of confinement in those
cases where lack of the mens rea element is phrased in terms of lack of
"capacity."
To summarize, the traditional bifurcated trial, though it is still plagued by
the insanity-mens rea connection, does answer some of the objections to the
unitary procedure: (1) defendant's admissions will not be before the jury
trying the preliminary issues;' 59 (2) the introduction of psychiatric evidence
at the first trial could probably be limited to those crimes involving special
155. See, e.g., People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959) ; People v. NVells,
33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949); Becksted v. People, 133 Colo.
72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956) ; State v. DiPaolo, 34 N.J. 279, 295-97, 168 A.2d 401, 409-10, cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 880 (1961).
156. Cf. People v. Farolan, 214 Cal. 396, 5 P.2d 893 (1931) (the jury first found de-
fendant guilty and then deadlocked on the issue of insanity; a second jury was impaneled to
try the insanity issue alone and found defendant sane). See 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 47 (1965).
157. See generally Dix, supra note 128, at 570-72.
158. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
159. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
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states of mind;' 6° (3) a jurisdiction which adheres to the Fisher rule can
eliminate the introduction of psychiatric evidence at the first trial; 16 ' (4) a
jurisdiction finding a violation of due process in the Fisher rule can reduce the
necessity of introducing psychiatric evidence at the first trial by the elimina-
tion, where possible, of special states of mind in the definition of crimes ° 2
B. Split Trial by Issues: Non-Psychiatric-Psychiatric
Granting that the traditional bifurcated trial is flawed by limitations re-
quired by due process, nevertheless it does provide more protection with regard
to self-incrimination. It would seem, therefore, "the underlying idea has suf-
ficient merit that the procedure should not be summarily dismissed as unsalvage-
able."'163 One commentator's variation would retain the bifurcated trial but
would rearrange slightly the distribution of the issues.'" Notice would be re-
quired of any defendant who intended to introduce evidence of mental impair-
ment' 65 and these issues, whether of complete legal insanity or of partial
impairment negating a special state of mind, would be determined at the second
trial. "The first trial would involve such issues as commission of the acts by the
defendant... and the existence of any other circumstances that might be essen-
tial to liability. In addition, the first phase would include a determination of
state of mind if this would not require the use of evidence of mental illness."'6 6
If the jury at the first trial resolved these questions of liability against the de-
fendant, he would be "held over" for the second trial; but at this point,
presumably, there would be no verdict of "guilty.)o 67 The evidence of mental
disorder would be introduced at the second trial and evidently could be con-
sidered as to factual state of mind or as to lack of capacity. However, the
procedure needs further clarification on this point. If the crime charged in-
volved a special state of mind, the jury might find: (1) that the defendant was
otherwise guilty but did not have the capacity to form the general mens rea,
160. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 148-49 supra and accompanying text.
162. See notes 150-53 supra and accompanying text.
163. Dix, supra note 128, at 573.
164. Id. at 575-76. "Rather than dividing the procedure between [sic] the traditional
'insanity' defense on one hand and everything else on the other, the trial might be split
between those issues involving proof of mental illness and those that do not." Id. at 575.
165. Accord, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.10 (McKinney 1971); cf. Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970), where an analagous requirement of giving notice of an alibi defense
withstood a constitutional attack based on the fifth amendment.
166. Dix, supra note 128, at 575. "For exampl, it is likely that in many burglary trials the
question of whether the defendant entertained an intent to commit a felony when he entered
the premises could be resolved without reference to psychological abnormality." Id.
167. This could be accomplished, for example, by the use of an interrogatory to the jury
asking for a "yes" or "no" answer to the question: "Did the defendant perform the acts
charged?" Cf. State ex rel La Follette v. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 627, 150 N.W.2d 318, 328
(1967); note 181 infra and accompanying text. Appropriate instructions could explain the




producing a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity; (2) that the defendant
had the capacity to form and actually harbored the general mens rea but did not
actually harbor the special state of mind, producing a verdict of guilty to a
lesser offense; or (3) that the defendant had the capacity to form the general
mens rea but did not in fact do so, producing a verdict of not guilty. Such a
verdict might be based on non-psychiatric evidence, in which case the defendant
would be not guilty regardless of any mental disorder or, under the Shaw rule,
on psychiatric evidence. If the not guilty verdict was the result of defendant's
mental disorder it would be in direct competition with the verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity and the policy of controlling those acquitted for insan-
ity.l6 8 Therefore, the jury in the second trial should only be allowed to con-
sider the evidence of mental disorder to reduce the degree of the crime
committed, or to render a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The not
guilty verdict should be reserved to those cases where, apart from the evidence
of mental disorder, the jury believes the defendant did not have the required
mens rea.
This modification would preserve the bifurcated trial's advantage in the area
of self-incrimination and reduce its liabilities in the area of duplication of
effort.169
IV. ALTERNATIm SOLUTIONS
The current gropings toward a satisfactory procedure suggest that whatever
the definitions used, society is interested in asking three distinct questions
through its criminal law. First, has the defendant performed some overt act
which society has prohibited? Second, assuming that the defendant has per-
formed the act, has he done so under conditions which dictate that society exert
its control over his freedom? Third, assuming the first two questions have been
answered in the affirmative, in what way should society exert its control in
order to best accomplish its purposes?
The problem, surrounding psychiatry and law, both practically and concep-
tually, is that the traditional definition of criminal conduct straddles all three
questions and the resulting criminal procedure sometimes runs like an entry in
a three-legged race. The first two questions go to the central issue of whether
or not the person's acts form a sufficient basis for the exertion of society's con-
trol. The third question corresponds more or less to the concept of "sentenc-
ing."'1 70 Society, through its current policy of confining those acquitted by reason
of insanity,'2 " has manifested an intention to confine those who commit pro-
scribed acts because their legal mental capacity is either partially or fully
168. If evidence of mental disorder may prove lack of capacity or negate the required
general mens rea element, the same proof could lead to two different verdicts.
169. In practice, the duplication of effort in a jurisdiction providing for both a bifurcated
trial and the admissibility of evidence of mental disorder to negate intent "is probably not
as serious as one might assume from the theoretical possibilities," Loulsell & Hazard, supra
note 36, at 830 n.82, because of stipulations by counsel that evidence offered at the first trial
might be presumed to be given at the second if before the same jury.
170. But see 83 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 31, at 666.
171. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
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impaired. This being so, it should be recognized that both of these psychiatric
issues relate to the third question-to the disposition of "controlled" defendants.
The main function of the jury trial has been to separate the "guilty" from the
"not guilty'--wich, in theory, corresponds to separating those over whom the
government could lawfully and properly exert its control from those who must
be allowed to remain free. One of the jury's functions is to prevent an over-
reaching government from using the criminal law to improperly exert its power
over the freedom of the people.172 One of the objects of the criminal law should
be to provide guidelines so that the jury can intelligently make the determina-
tion between those who may properly be controlled and those who may not. 73
To protect the rights of the individual citizen, the law requires that the distinc-
tion between these groups be drawn "beyond a reasonable doubt"
The first guideline which the law offers the jury creates no problem: Has
the defendant performed the prohibited act, the actus reus? (Was it the de-
fendant who did it? Was it the prohibited act?) If society wished to control
all those who performed the prohibited act, psychiatry would create no problems
since there would be no mental element to consider. It would, therefore, be im-
possible to confuse the question of mental capacity with the more fundamental
question of who is to be controlled. However, society does not wish to exercise
its control over all those who have performed the overt act: For example, those
who kill in self-defense' 7 4 or by non-negligent accident 75 are allowed to remain
free. To distinguish between those defendants who are to be confined for having
performed the overt act and those who are not to be confined, the law has further
defined crime with the addition of a second element-the mens rea or guilty
intention. This is the source of the confusion since, as has been discussed pre-
viously,176 mens rea is no longer an efficient tool for separating those who are to
be controlled from those who are to be left free. If defendant is able to show that
he did not have the required intent because he was mentally incapable of form-
ing it, he is confined anyway. 77 The policy of defining crime in terms of mens
rea allows the introduction of psychiatric evidence bearing upon this threshold
question of who will be controlled when it is not relevant here-but rather on the
issue of what control should be exercised.
A. SequentiaZ Order of Proof
Even within the current statutory limitations, the judiciary may have a means
of improving the situation as indicated by the call of the Wisconsin court for
172. 3. Frank, Courts on Trial 109 (1950). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US. 145,
151 (1968); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 380 (1898); Ex parte Milligan, 71 US. (4
Wall) 2 (1866); People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 52 N.E. 572 (1899).
173. See Insanity Defense, supra note 18, at 8487.
174. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
175. See, e.g., Cal. Ann. Penal Code § 26(six) (West 1970); N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05
(McKinney 1967).
176. See notes 88-97 supra and accompanying text.
177. Cal. Penal Code § 1026 (West 1970); see, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301(d) (Supp.
1972); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20 (McKinney 1971); note 88 supra.
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a "sequential order of proof" in the face of a statute calling for a single trial.178
The judiciary has the power to control the presentation of evidence at trial"70
and to request special findings of fact from the jury.180 These powers could be
utilized, in an appropriate instance, to break up the trial before a single jury1 81
into three or four distinct stages, each separated by a special jury verdict on
the issues presented at that stage.
The first stage should be on the issue of defendant's commission of the overt
act. All evidence not relevant to the commission of the overt act would be ex-
cluded at this point. The jury would be requested to return a "Yes" or "No"
answer to the question: "Did the defendant perform the act charged?" The
jury would have to retire to discuss their special finding just as they do now.
If the finding was "No," the defendant would be released and a verdict of Not
Guilty entered. If the finding was "Yes," the trial would proceed to the next
stage before the same jury.
In the second stage the prosecution would have to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had the required mens rea apart from any defense of
mental disorder. Evidence of mental disorder would again be excluded. Follow-
ing the presentation of the evidence, the jury would again be asked for a special
finding: either Not Guilty or "Guilty in the absence of a defense." It might be
explained to the jury that the verdict was not yet a finding of Guilty and that
the defendant still had an opportunity to offer exculpatory evidence at the
next stage.
The third stage would consider the issues involving psychiatric testimony.
Depending on the jurisdiction's holdings with regard to the consideration of
mental disorder to reduce the grade of the crime,182 the issue at this stage would
be either the grade of the crime, the criminal incapacity of the defendant, or
both. After the presentation of evidence the jury could be asked to return one
of the following verdicts: Guilty; Guilty to a lesser offense; or Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity. In this way defendant's evidence of psychological abnormality
may be considered on all issues to which it is relevant without jeopardizing his
plea of not guilty.
Such a procedure would eliminate the possibility that an admission to a
psychiatrist could influence a jury in its finding with regard to the commission
178. State v. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967); see note 124 supra.
179. Wills v. Russell, 100 U.S. 621, 626 (1879); State v. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150
N.W.2d 318 (1967); see 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 116 (1945).
180. Grimes Dry Goods Co. v. Malcolm, 164 U.S. 483, 490 (1896); Freedman v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 81 Conn. 601, 612, 71 A. 901, 905 (1909). See generally 53 Am. Jur.
Trial § 1065 (1945).
181. The sequential order of proof would seem to be the essential ingredient In both the
traditional bifurcated trial (see note 124 supra and accompanying text), and the variation
suggested by Professor Dix. See note 163 supra and accompanying text. This is clear when
the same jury tries both stages of the bifurcated trial. However, the concept seems susceptible
to greater exploitation than the bifurcated trial procedures or the Wisconsin decision suggest.
See State v. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967).
182. See note 148 supra.
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of the overt actiam and thus offer more protection to the defendant's right against
self-incrimination than the current procedures do. However, the privilege against
self-incrimination would remain susceptible of violation to the extent that the
prosecution used defendant's statements to the psychiatrist as the basis for
expert opinion tending to show that defendant had the required mens rea.18
Since a "sequential order of proof" would require a finding that the de-
fendant committed the overt act, the procedure would eliminate the procedural
gap (and latent possibility of gross injustice) which currently allows defendants
to be confined without a specific verdict on their commission of the overt act.28-
With a finding on the overt act in the first stage in the process, the jury would
be logically entitled to rely on the fact of the defendant's commission of the act
in judging his mental condition. In those procedures trying the insanity issue
first, :1' it does not seem proper to rely on the fact of the commission of the
act as evidence of insanity if the defendant denies having performed it. Since
the commission of the overt act is frequently the major evidence indicating
defendant's mental instability,187 it would seem proper to have that issue
resolved against him before allowing a jury to consider it as evidence of his
insanity.
B. Elimination of Mens Rea
One possible statutory solution would be to eliminate mens rea entirely and to
define all crimes merely in terms of overt acts.1 88 Presumably, the jury would
decide only if the defendant had performed the act, and those who were not in-
tended to be controlled would be released at the "disposition" or "sentencing"
stage. While this avoids the confusion of mens rea, it takes out of the hands
of the jury the full determination of who is properly subject to control by
society. Some of the people passed on to "disposition" would be those who tra-
ditionally did not come under the criminal law, i.e., those who performed the
act through accident, authority of law, etc. Such defendants would have to
depend partly on the discretion of experts rather than the judgment of their
peers, and this procedure would seem to sacrifice too much of the individual's
valuable protection against government overreaching. The problem posed by the
juncture of psychiatry and law, therefore, is to offer the jury a guideline which
will enable it to further distinguish between those to be controlled because of
their overt acts and those who will remain free in spite of them-while structur-
183. See note 42 supra.
184. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
185. See Insanity Defense, supra note 18, at 144.
186. See note 127 supra.
187. Cf. Insanity Defense, supra note 18, at 932-33.
188. Katz, Dangerousness: A Theoretical Reconstruction of the Criminal Law, Part I,
19 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 9 (1969). See also B. Wooton, Crime and the Criminal Law: Reflections
of a Magistrate and Social Scientist (1963) ; Levitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine of
Mens Rea, 17 IlL L. Rev. 578, 589 (1923); Scanderett, The Obsolescence of Criminal Guilt,
27 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & C. 828 (1937).
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ing the guideline so as to preclude the relevancy of evidence of mental disorder
at this initial stage.
C. Modification of Mens Rea
This goal might be accomplished fairly easily by modifying the traditional
definitions of mental culpability 89 so as to simply exclude the relevance of psy-
chiatric evidence. For example, New York might add to its Penal Law section
defining criminal culpability190 the proviso: "The culpable mental state defined
herein includes that state of mind which is the result of mental disease, defect
or genetic abnormality." Though this definition is not completely satisfactory
from a purely logical point of view, it accomplishes the desired result and
avoids logical inconsistencies in the resulting procedures. The insanity "defense"
would be abolished and the issues it involves recognized as pertinent to the
disposition of the confined accused rather than to whether he should be con-
fined or not. Since the very definition of crime would exclude the relevance of
psychiatric issues, there would be no such testimony offered to the jury and the
original purpose of the bifurcated trial would be retained. Furthermore, the
complications inherent in the current trial-connected mental examination would
be eliminated since any statements made in such a procedure would reflect only
on the defendant's disposition after conviction and not on the threshold deci-
sion of whether or not a crime was committed by the defendant.
A convicted defendant might be more likely to cooperate with the examina-
tion since the chances of its working to his disadvantage would be considerably
reduced. If a defendant continued to balk, his refusal would not be so crucial
since he might be observed over a more extended period of time by mental
health personnel and a decision could be made based upon this observation.
Also, since the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime would have
greatly reduced relevancy, if any at all, 191 the necessity of defendant's verbal
189. See H. Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law 24-27 (1965).
190. N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05 (McKinney 1967).
191. The current choice exercised by a jury between the verdicts of guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity determines what type of confinement a defendant will receive. Note 88
supra. However, in choosing these verdicts the jury also determines the criterion for release
from confinement. If the defendant is found guilty, he will be released when his time is up
regardless of his mental condition, although the government may introduce civil commitment
proceedings if warranted. If the defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity, his resulting
confinement does not terminate at the end of a set period but is contingent upon the defen-
dant's mental condition. If the insanity defense were abandoned other arrangements would
have to be made for determining the criterion of the defendant's release from confinement.
If desired, the criterion for release could still hinge on the defendant's mental condition at the
time of the crime. The psychiatrists examining the defendant for the purpose of making the
proper disposition could attempt to discover the defendant's mental state at the time of the
crime, just as they do now, and could use this as the basis for determining the criterion for
release. It would seem more appropriate to attack this problem directly under a new procedure
and to formulate another method of deciding this important question. However, the modifi-
cation of the mens rea concept would seem workable whether or not the release procedures
were reformed.
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cooperation in determining his disposition would also be greatly reduced. The
main issues would be his current state of mental health and his potential
dangerousness. 192
Under the present procedures, only those defendants who are able to convince
a lay jury that they come within the legal definition of insanity are permitted
the sentencing option of confinement to a "mental" institution rather than a
"correctional" institution. It does not seem that society's interest is best served
by this confusion of a sentencing decision with a control decision. It might very
well be that a person who cannot establish that he fits within the insanity rule,
whatever that may be, would be more likely to conform his conduct to society's
norms after confinement in an institution using predominantly "mental health"
techniques. Conversely, as the current New York law recognizes,103 it might
best serve society's interests to place a defendant "acquitted by reason of in-
sanity" in an institution utilizing "correctional" techniques rather than "mental
health" techniques. 94
The correct question would seem to be: "What disposition of this defendant
will best reduce the possibility of future criminal actions by this defendant and
others?"; rather than "What was the mental state of this defendant at the time
of the overt act?" And this question should be asked with regard to nearly
every defendant who will be confined after trial, not only those who have con-
vinced a jury that they are not "responsible." In a post-conviction setting,
the psychiatrists would be able to utilize the full range of their disciplineO
without usurping a judgment that should be left to representatives of community
thought.
This "Bifurcated Procedure"'--first, trial by jury to determine the question
of whether defendant has done something to allow society to confine him, and
then examination by psychiatric and penal experts to determine the appropriate
type of confinement-would seem to best allow the harmonious interplay of law
and psychiatry without having either discipline encroach upon the recognized
192. The criteria used to distinguish between types of confinement would obviously be
significant and it may be that establishing such criteria and reviewing decisions made under
this procedure should be the domain of the law and the court. See Dershowitz, Two Models
of Commitment: The Medical and the Legal, The Humanist, July/Aug. 1971, at 19. The
examiners should not be permitted to act arbitrarily, but the legal criteria should have a
high degree of correlation to medical knowledge.
193. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20(6) (McKinney 1971); N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law
§ 85 (McKinney 1970).
194. Furthermore, phrasing the dispositional alternatives in terms of "punitive-correc-
tional" versus '"medical-custodial" may not do justice to the factual possibilities facing a
defendant. It could very well be that a prison will have better treatment facilities than a
hospital. See Insanity Defense, supra note 24, 186 at 18.
195. Dr. Daniel Schwartz, forensic psychiatrist at Downstate Medical Center, Brooklyn,
New York, has categorized the psychiatrist's role in the criminal process into three stages:
(1) competency; (2) determining sanity at the time of the crime; (3) advising the court as
to the disposition of the convicted defendant. According to Dr. Schwartz it is only the last
stage, that of post-conviction disposition, that affords the psychiatrist a logical and useful
role. Lecture, The New School, Dec. 17, 1971.
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expertise of the other. The law would still offer protection against overreaching
government with its privilege of self-incrimination intact, and psychiatry would
still perform its proper function of matching a treatment with a defendant with-
out having to draw the fine lines between legally defined categories as required
by the law. If desirable, the second stage could be under court control, with the
experts reporting their findings to the judge. The second stage could be review-
able if further protection was desired.
D. The Constitutionality of Modifying Mens Rea
Though the proposal may not have been offered in connection with the con-
stitutional problems of pre-trial mental examinations, the "[a]bandonment of
the insanity defense is hardly a novel proposal or an isolated one."10 0 Some
commentators have expressed doubt concerning the constitutionality of such a
procedure, 97 since three state courts have overturned statutes which had the
effect of curtailing or abolishing the insanity defense. 198 It is submitted, how-
ever, that these cases are based on much narrower holdings than is generally
recognized' 99 and do not stand for the proposition that a statute effectuating the
abandonment of the insanity defense is per se unconstitutional.
In each of the three cases, the statutes200 involved were overturned on the
196. Brakel & Rock, supra note 2, at 378 & n.11. See S. Glueck, Law and Psychiatry
147-53 (1962); S. Halleck, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Crime 341-42 (1967); H. Hart,
The Morality of the Criminal Law 24-27 (1965); K. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment
132-40 (1968); T. Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry 228-29 (1963); B. Wootton, Crime
and the Criminal Law 32-84 (1963); Abolish the Insanity Defense, supra note 35; Morris,
Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 514 (1968); Robinson, Con-
sultant's Report on Criminal Responsibility-Mental Illness: Section 503, in 1 Working
Papers of the Nat'l Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 229-34, 247 (1970);
Weintraub, Criminal Responsibility: Psychiatry Alone Cannot Determine It, 56 A.B.A.J.
1075 (1963). Weintraub, Address to the Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Federal
Circuit, 37 F.R.D. 365, 369 (1964). Of course, the insanity defense has its defenders. See, e.g.,
Insanity Defense, supra note 18, at 222-26. For a summary of some of the arguments ad-
vanced for abandoning the insanity defense see Morris, supra at 544. Those advancing such
arguments do not necessarily share similar premises or solutions.
197. See Brakel & Rock, supra note 2, at 378; Perkins, supra note 20, at 885; Welhofen,
supra note 46, at 477-80.
198. State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929) ; Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132
So. 581 (1931) (per curiam) ; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
199. See, e.g., Brakel & Rock, supra note 2, at 378-79; Insanity Defense, supra note 18, at
222-23; Perkins, supra note 20, at 885-88.
200. The Louisiana statute provided for a bifurcated trial with the insanity issue tried
first before a Lunacy Commission composed of the superintendents of three state institutions
or their designees: "The findings of the Commission or of a majority of its members shall,
.. constitute the report of the Commission of Lunacy. If said report be that the accused Is
presently insane, or was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, be shall forthwith
be committed to the criminal ward of a hospital for the insane, there to remain until dis.
charged in due course of law. But if the report be that the accused is presently sane and was
sane at the time of the commission of the crime, said findings of sanity shall be final, and the
accused shall be forthwith returned to the parish in which the offense was committed and
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basis of the state rather than the federal constitution.201 Thus, they provide no
direct precedent on the status of the insanity defense vis-a-vis the federal consti-
tution. But the holdings were based partially on violations of the due process
clause of the state constitutions which, as in most states, were derived from the
fifth amendment 2 02 Therefore, despite the fact that state court decisions arriv-
ing at squarely contradictory results in interpreting "due process" have been
allowed to stand,203 the decisions may warrant consideration from the federal
analogy.
tried upon the question of guilt or innocence, and insanity shall not thereafter be urged as a
defense.' No. 17, [1928] La. Acts Ex. Sess. 34, 35.
The Mississippi statute provided that "the insanity of the defendant at the time of the
commission of the crime shall not be a defense against indictments for murder and the
courts shall so instruct the jury in trials for murder, but evidence tending to prove the in-
sanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense may be offered by the
defendant in mitigation of the crime. In the event the jury shall find the defendant guilty as
charged in the indictment, but insane at the time of the commission of the crime, they shal
so state in their verdict, and shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the state penitentiary
for life ... ?I Law of April 3, 1928, ch. 75, § 1, (1928) Mss. Laws 92. If the jury disagreed
on the insanity issue the judge could impose the life sentence. In either case uthe trial judge
may, in his discretion, certify to the governor that in his opinion the mental condition of the
prisoner is such that he should not be confined in the penitentiary, in which event the
governor shall cause an investigation to be made ... and if satisfied that the mental
condition of the defendant is such that he should not be confined in the penitentiary he shall
order the transfer of such prisoner to one of said institutions for the care of the insane ...."
Id. § 2; see Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 156, 132 So. 581, 582-83 (1931) (per curiam).
The Washington statute provided: "It shall be no defense to a person charged with the com-
mission of a crime, that at the time of its commission, he was unable by reason of his
insanity, idiocy or imbecility to comprehend the nature and quality of the act committed,
or to understand that it was wrong; or that he was afflicted with a morbid propensity to
commit prohibited acts; nor shall any testimony or other proof thereof be admitted in
evidence;" and "[w~henever, in the judgment of the court trying the same, any person con-
victed of a crime shall have been at the time of its commission unable by reason of his
insanity, idiocy or imbecility, to comprehend the nature and quality of his act, or to under-
stand that it was wrong, or shall be at the time of his conviction or sentence insane or an
idiot, or imbecile, such court may in its discretion direct that such person be confined for treat-
ment in one of the state hospitals for the insane or in the insane ward of the state penitentiary,
until such person shall have recovered his sanity. In determining whether any person con-
victed [meets the above criteria] the court may take counsel with one or more experts in the
diagnosis and treatment of insanity ...." Law of Oct. 21, 1909, ch. 249, §§ 7 & 31, [1909]
Wash. Laws 890.
201. State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 964, 123 So. 639, 641 (1929); Sincair v. State, 161 biss.
142, 153, 132 So. 581, 582 (1931) (per curiam) ; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 116-2 1, 110
P. 1020, 1023-24 (1910).
202. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." Wash. Const. art. 1, § 3; accord, U.S. Const. amend. V; La. Const. art. 1, § 6; Mss.
Const. art. 3, § 14.
203. Compare People ex reL Juhan v. District Ct., 165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741 (1968)
(en banc), with Leland v. Oregon, 343 US. 790 (1952). "There is not the slghtest requirement
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From this perspective, the most salient feature of the overturned statutes is
that none of them altered the definition of crime or criminal liability.20 4 While
mens rea, as traditionally defined, remained an essential element of crime, the
legislatures decreed that the defendant would not be permitted to demonstrate
to a jury of his peers that one of the elements essential to the commission of
crime was absent in his case20 5 The precise issue litigated, therefore, was not
whether the concept of mens rea could be redefined by the legislature so as to
make insanity irrelevant, but whether the legislature could prevent the defendant
from proving to a jury that his conduct did not correspond to the definition of
the crime charged. This can be seen from the phrasing of the issue in the
leading case of State v. Strasburg:20 "Can the legislature under our [state]
constitution so circumscribe inquiry touching the question of the guilt of the
accused as to exclude all consideration by the jury of his insanity at the time of
committing the act?" 20 7 Faced with this issue, the courts correctly found a
violation of procedural due process and overturned the statutes.20 8 No doubt
such a result would also be mandated by the federal constitution.
If, as proposed here, a statute altered the concept of criminal liability so as to
make mental disorder irrelevant, a different question would be presented for
constitutional scrutiny. It is well established that the legislature has the power to
define crime20 9 and that the will of the legislature in this respect is absolute so
long as constitutional safeguards are not infringed. 210 If the legislature has the
power to redefine mens rea so as to make mental disorder irrelevant, there would
be no procedural denial of due process since it is fundamental that courts have
the power to exclude information that is irrelevant to the crime charged.2 11
But due process also requires that governmental action shall be consistent with
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our
political institutions.212 The question then presented is whether the suggested
modification of the concept of mens rea violates this fundamental fairness. The
validity of the statute under this standard should be determined by its practical
operation and effect and not by the labels involved.2 18
It would seem that this question has already been answered in another form
that the meaning of 'due process of law' shall be the same in each of the fifty states."
People ex rel. Juhan v. District Ct., supra, at 260-61, 439 P.2d at 745.
204. See note 200 supra.
205. Id.
206. 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
207. Id. at 116, 110 P. at 1023 (emphasis added).
208. State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 964-65, 123 So. 639, 642 (1929); Sinclair v. State, 161
Miss. 142, 153, 132 So. 581, 582 (1931) (per curiam); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 121,
110 P. 1020, 1024 (1910).
209. E.g., Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916).
210. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 "(1912); People v. West, 106 N.Y.
293, 295, 12 N.E. 610, 612 (1887).
211. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 158 (1964).
212. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (dictum); Brown v. MissiLsippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936) (dictum).
213. See Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); cf. Pearson v. McGraw,
308 U.S. 313 (1939); Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904).
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in those cases upholding the constitutionality of mandatory commitment follow-
ing acquittal by reason of insanity.2 14 Such statutes have been upheld despite the
fact that the commitment may be based upon a finding of insanity at the time
of the crime -without any finding or hearing as to current mental state;216 despite
the fact that the defendant will be confined in a correctional institution rather
than a civil hospital;21 6 and despite the fact that the resulting confinement may
greatly exceed the maximum sentence that could be imposed upon a defendant
adjudged "guilty."2 17 These holdings indicate, a fortiori,218 that the exertion
of government control over a defendant who would be found guilty but for the
defense of insanity does not violate the "fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice." Even if the above holdings were reversed and found
to be violations of due process (as some of them may warrant), the infringement
of the constitutional standard would seem to lie in the procedures used to deprive
the defendant of his liberty rather than in the basic application of the criminal
law to defendants acting as a result of mental disorder. In most jurisdictions2io
the criminal law is currently applied with constitutional sanction to those suffer-
ing from mental disorders since it is only the defendant whose mental disability
prevents him from knowing right from wrong2 0 who qualifies for commitment
rather than incarceration 2 21
Of course, the protection of "fundamental fairness" should not dissolve once
the government has shown a proper and just basis for the initial exercise of its
authority. The denial of due process may occur as easily and with as harmful
results at the post-conviction as well as at the pre-conviction stage. A statute
authorizing the abandonment of the insanity defense through a modification of
the concept of mens rea would have to provide for a procedure which would
guarantee the convicted defendant a rational disposition and a rational criterion
for release.222 However, taken in conjunction with such a procedure, a statute
214. E.g., Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 P. 769 (1930); Ex parte Clark, 86 Kan.
539, 121 P. 492 (1912); Northfoss v. Welch, 116 Ainn. 62, 133 N.W 82 (1911); People ex
rel. Peabody v. Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159, 117 N.Y.S. 322 (2d Dep't), affd mem., 196 N.Y.
525, 89 N.E. 1109 (1909) ; State ex rel. Thompson v. Snell, 46 Wash. 327, 89 P. 931 (1907).
215. E.g., State ex rel. Thompson v. Snell, 46 Wash. 327, 89 P. 931 (1907).
216. E.g., Ex parte Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 81 P. 552 (1905).
217. E.g., Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
218. Or in plain English rather than Latin: "We have swallowed the camel, why strain
out the gnat?" Sinclair v. State, 161 Ams. 142, 193, 132 So. 581, 596 (1931) (Smith, C.J,
dissenting).
219. See note 20 supra.
220. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 US. 469, 485 (1895) ; Sauer v. United States, 241
F.2d 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 US. 940 (1957); State v. Di Paolo, 34 N.J. 279, 168
A.2d 401, cert. denied, 368 US. 880 (1961). See also Fisher v. United States, 328 US. 463
(1946).
221. "[Aln accused may have a mental disorder or deficiency and in some cases still
be mentally competent to be held legally responsible for his crime." Mins v. United States,
375 F.2d 135, 142 (5th Cir. 1967) (footnote omitted).
222. See Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 Harv. L. Rev.
821, 843-46 (1968).
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making mental disorder irrelevant to crime would be fundamentally fair and
should withstand a constitutional attack based on denial of due process of law.
The validity of abolishing the insanity defense has also been attacked on other
constitutional grounds, 223 primarily as impinging upon the right of trial by
jury.224 The jury trial challenge, like the procedural due process argument, is
valid only if the statute prevents an accused from having a jury of his peers
decide upon the presence or absence of all elements essential to guilt.226 If the
statute eliminates the correlation between mental disorder and mens rea by
modifying the definition of criminal liability, the defendant will be afforded a
jury trial on all essential factual elements. It seems clear that this challenge
ultimately depends upon the outcome of the substantive due process argument
discussed above. 226
It would appear that a statute which effectuated the abolition of the insanity
defense could not be declared unconstitutional per se. The constitutional stan-
dard of due process through fundamental fairness should be applied to the
entire procedure provided for by such a statute rather than artificially con-
centrating on only one link in the chain of procedures affecting the defendant.
Tested by such a standard, the validity of the procedure would vary from
statute to statute, and a properly drafted statute should withstand a properly
applied due process test.
V EFFECT ON INCOMPETENCE TO STAND TRiAL
It is suggested that the same approach would best reconcile the problems of
the pre-trial mental examination for incompetency to stand trial. The first
question that should be asked is whether or not there is sufficient basis in the
defendant's conduct for society to exert its control over him. This question
223. An equal protection argument was advanced and received favorably by a plurality of
judges in Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 167, 132 So. 581, 586 (1931). However, those
favoring this viewpoint interpreted the statute before them as providing for a straight life
sentence in a prison for a defendant found insane at the time of the crime as compared to a
twenty year sentence for a sane defendant. Id. at 167, 132 So. at 587. On these facts, a
plurality in Sinclair also found a violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 164, 132 So. at 585-86. Both findings would seem to be properly limited to
the statute at bar and would have limited relevance to a statute which did not predetermine
the disposition. The cruel and unusual punishment objection would seem to limit only the
disposition of a convicted defendant rather than bearing directly upon the constitutionality
of abandoning the insanity defense. The current tests of mental incapacity permit the Im-
prisonment of defendants suffering from mental disorder, and this result follows, except under
the Durham type test, even if the overt act was caused by the mental disorder. See note 20
supra. See also State v. Tyler, 77 Wash. 2d 726, 466 P.2d 120 (1970) (en banc), holding that,
to qualify as a defense, insanity must not be self induced. Id. at 739, 466 P.2d at 128. Thus
insanity itself does not prevent the application of the criminal law to the defendant.
224. E.g., State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
225. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722
(1961); United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Dem. Publ. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407,
434-35 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
226. See text accompanying notes 212-22; cf. Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 173, 132 So.
581, 592 (1931) (Smith, C.J., dissenting).
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should be answered by a jury. If the jury answers "Not Guilty," then the de-
fendant should be released regardless of his competency to stand trial. If he is
thought not a fit subject for unconditional release, further proceedings should be
introduced under appropriate civil commitment laws,2  not under criminal laws,
since it has not been proven to a jury's satisfaction that his actions were
criminal. If defendant is found "Guilty" by the jury and incompetent to stand
trial by the court, he should be committed to an appropriate institution-pre-
sumably a mental institution. At this point at least there has been some showing
that the state has a sufficient basis for the confinement and this judgment has
been made by the defendant's peers and not an "expert" or administrator.
Whether the defendant is actually incompetent or not, he has lost nothing at
this particular stage. However, once he returns to competence the issue of the
"fairness" of his trial once again becomes relevant. If he had been able to
properly assist in his defense, he might have been able to help convince the jury
to return a not guilty verdict. -2 2 8 At this point the defendant should be entitled
to a second trial,229 or at least a hearing to determine whether or not his in-
competence at the initial trial made any significant difference. Even if he is
accorded a second trial, it must be remembered that the prosecution would
probably be able to preserve much more of its case having gone through the first
trial than under the current procedure where the prosecution may not have
prepared a case against the defendant at all.2 9 The second possibility of a
"hearing" rather than a trial raises questions of due process. However, it is sub-
mitted that this proposition should be carefully considered, since the possibilities
of the defendant's being prejudiced by being incompetent would seem relatively
small under the modern practice of representation by counsel.
This procedure increases the work of the prosecution but not intolerably nor
without reason. If an incompetent defendant is going to be confined by the state
for extended period of time, he is certainly entitled to a prosecution showing and
a jury verdict that it is being done justly, the same as a competent defendant
gets. Despite the fact of the defendant's incompetency it is suggested that, even
under a "hearing" system, the defendant would receive greater "due process"
protection than he does under the "fair trial" doctrine as it now stands.e-l
There is no doubt that a defendant's rights would be best preserved under a
system which provided a "re-trial" for every incompetent defendant who re-
gained competency. But the incidence of actual prejudice may not warrant an
automatic "free trial" guarantee to all defendants. Of those defendants returning
to competency, many would probably find that the prosecution had no further
interest in retrial, and these would be released just as they are under the current
procedure. If the prosecution wished to avoid the release of a defendant who had
returned to competency, the defendant would be entitled to a hearing on the
227. E.g., N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 70 (McKinney 1971).
228. See Foote, supra note 19, at 842; 81 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 19, at 456, 458.
229. The second trial "solution" was rejected in Mental Illness, Due Process (1968), supra
note 25, at 115 n.104, perhaps because of the expense involved. Cf. Eizenstat, supra
note 19, at 400.
230. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
231. See notes 107-19 supra and accompanying text.
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issue of whether a new trial should be granted or the initial trial given binding
effect. The hearing would attempt to determine which defendants still facing
prosecution might actually have been prejudiced by their incompetency at the
initial trial and award new trials only to these.
If this procedure were combined with that described for the insanity issues,
the reluctance of the examining psychiatrist to find the defendant competent 20 2
would be diminished because the defendant could be returned to psychiatrists for
mental care if necessary after conviction. A psychiatrist who felt that a defendant
would profit from "mental health" treatment rather than incarceration could
present that point fully at the disposition stage and would not be put in the
position of improving the defendant's mental health only to serve the legal
process rather than the defendant's own needs. Finally, the fact that there has
already been such a strong showing of the basis for governmental authority might
create a situation in which an incompetent defendant would view his improve-
ment in mental health as a method of securing a "second chance" rather than
a method of exposing himself to the jeopardy of an initial finding of guilt.230
VI CONCLUSIoN
Pre-trial mental examinations to determine sanity and competence are the
result of an accommodation between the disciplines of law and psychiatry and
consequently compromise the defendant's constitutional rights and the psy-
chiatrist's proper role vis-h-vis both the defendant and society. It is submitted
that the source of this accommodation is the confusion in the current procedures
with regard to the stage in the criminal process at which evidence of mental
impairment is relevant. To clear up this confusion, procedures should be de-
veloped which would focus the jury's deliberations initially on the sole question
of whether or not defendant's conduct is such that the criminal law will subject
him to government control over his freedom. This issue should be determined
by a jury trial on the merits before the defendant is subjected to lengthy confine-
ment or control, regardless of whether or not he is competent to stand trial. By
isolating the initial question of control over the defendant, reducing jury con-
fusion over psychiatric testimony, and protecting to a greater extent the defen-
dant's privilege against self-incrimination, the traditional bifurcated trial has
much to offer and deserves judicial consideration. Furthermore, variations on the
basic idea of the bifurcated trial suggest that it would be possible to retain the
benefits of this procedure and to reduce somewhat its liabilities.
Finally, though the merits of a bifurcated trial procedure warrant, on balance,
judicial implementation, it would seem that a more consistent and effective
method of dealing with the problems introduced by pre-trial mental examinations
would be the legislative abolition of the relevancy of psychiatric evidence in the
trial stage, with a resulting "bifurcated procedure" rather than a trial. The first
stage of the procedure should consist of a jury determination of liability to gov-
ernment control while the second stage should be a determination by psychiatric
and penal experts, under court supervision if desired, as to what type of control
would best effectuate society's goals.
232. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
233. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
